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Abstract 
 
Humanitarian food assistance is incredibly susceptible to funding cuts, which reduces the quantity 
of food available to refugees. If refugees depend solely on food aid for survival, the implication of 
reductions is increased food insecurity at a household level. The Government of Uganda 
champions a self-reliance strategy that has failed to support refugees to the desired extent, 
especially when food rations are low. This study aims to assess the impact of humanitarian food 
assistance on the socioeconomic structures of refugee settlements in Adjumani, Uganda to 
understand the consequences of unstable food aid. The research was conducted over a four-week 
period. The sample consisted of eight key-informant interviews, 17 in-depth interviews with 
refugees, two focus groups. Data was also collected through participant observation of food and 
cash distribution, morning team meetings, secondary sources, and through a household food 
insecurity questionnaire. This research argues that the role of food aid must be rethought as an 
economic asset rather than just a means to food security. Doing so highlights the importance and 
role of income-generating activities in forming strong socioeconomic structures for refugees to 
provide them with alternative, more sustainable means, of achieving a state of food security. The 
research also addresses (1) how procurement strategies continue to marginalize the everyday 
Ugandan farmer; (2) the innate hypocrisy in the institutional defense of cash-based interventions; 
(3) the lack of dietary diversity in the food aid package and the possible ensuing micronutrient 
deficiencies; (4) the high-levels of chronic food insecurity in Boroli and Mireyi refugee 
settlements; (5) possible solutions for a more sustainable future.  
 
Keywords: food security, food aid, humanitarian assistance, WFP, livelihoods, income-
generating activities, socioeconomic structures 
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Humanitarian Assistance in Protracted Emergencies:  
Rethinking the Role of Food Aid in Adjumani 
 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
Despite facing its own development challenges, Uganda is currently hosting over 1.2 
million refugees, the largest number in the country’s history, and continues to receive simultaneous 
arrivals from South Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Burundi (UNHCR, 2019). 
Worldwide, Uganda’s model for resettling refugees is renowned for its emphasis on self-
sufficiency. However, funding has been a constant challenge faced by the Government of Uganda, 
the UNHCR, and all of the UN’s implementing and operating partners. Shortfalls of resources 
manifest themselves in cuts in the food aid relief packages offered. Such reductions are supposed 
to be mitigated by the Government of Uganda’s self-reliance strategy for refugees. However, food 
insecurity still persists in the settlements. This study aims to explore the effects of humanitarian 
food assistance on socioeconomic structures in refugee settlements in Adjumani District to 
understand the broader role of food aid and livelihoods in achieving food security.  
According to Article 25 of the UDHR, food security is a fundamental human right and 
essential for human existence (UN General Assembly, 1948). It is a critical aspect of Uganda’s 
Vision 2040 and a part of the Sustainable Development Goals. SDG 2: Zero Hunger, recognizes 
the importance of hunger eradication as one of the key solutions for development as it is 
intrinsically linked to almost every other sustainable development goal. Achieving food security 
would help alleviate and eradicate poverty as people (SDG 1), would lead to significantly better 
health and well-being as individuals would not be malnourished (SDG 3), and for the youth, allow 
them to be in good enough conditions to attend school (SDG 4). Furthermore, attaining food 
security in households can improve gender equality, as women and men would both be able to eat 
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(SDG 5), and would lead to reduced inequalities (SDG 10). Refugees, more specifically, are 
stripped of their human rights as soon as they are persecuted in their countries and forced to flee. 
Food is essential for their immediate and long-term survival. When it is not granted to them in the 
settlement, it only strips them further of their autonomy as human beings.  
This work is centered in the human security paradigm, which was introduced in the 1994 
Global Human Development Report (Gómez and Gasper, 2003). The General Assembly adopted 
the following definition of the concept in 2012:  
“The human security approach broadens the scope of security analysis and policy from 
territorial security to the security of people. The 2012 GA Resolution stresses the role 
of ‘Member States in identifying and addressing widespread and cross-cutting 
challenges to survival, livelihood and dignity of their people’. In other words, threat(s) 
to – and values under threat in – people’s lives are the key starting point of a human 
security report.” 
The two major components of human security are ‘freedom from fear’, meaning that no one should 
be in fear of their government, armed forces, undemocratic police, neighbors…, and ‘freedom 
from want’, which references freedom from issues of official corruption or certain groups being 
guaranteed more of a country’s resources than other groups (Gómez and Gasper, 2003). The HDR 
listed seven essential dimensions of human security, which are “neither comprehensive nor 
definitive”: economic, health, personal, political, food, environmental, and community (Gómez 
and Gasper, 2003). This framework is interlinked to human development, which focuses more 
broadly on enlarging people’s choices and freedoms. However, human security goes a couple of 
steps further by ensuring priority freedoms so that “people can exercise choices safely and freely” 
and focusing on understanding potential threats in order to implement preventative measures 
(Gómez and Gasper, 2003). 
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Background 
The Conflict in South Sudan. 
South Sudan, the world’s youngest nation, has suffered from ethno-civic conflict since 
2013, two years after its independence from Sudan. The root of the violence can be traced back to 
the start of Sudan’s civil war in 1983 (Vox, 2016). Post-independent Sudan left the country split 
between the Muslim-north, the ruling elite under the British, and the Christian-south, which had 
been historically marginalized. Decades of fighting between the two finally led to the signing of 
the Comprehensive Peace Agreement between the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People’s 
Liberation Movement in 2005, monitored by the United Nations Security Council. As a result, a 
referendum was orchestrated in 2011 to allow southerners a chance for independence (Williams, 
2017) 
In a move to demonstrate a new and peaceful beginning, Salva Kiir, a Dinka and president 
of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) decided to appoint Riek Machar, a 
Nuer, as his vice president. While fighting for independence, the 60 plus ethnic groups ignored 
their differences to fight together for a common goal; the two largest groups being the Dinkas and 
the Nuers (Vox, 2016). Yet the tensions that had existed between the two ethnic groups for years 
were not so easily squashed and slowly began to resurface. Rumors of a coup d’état began 
circulating in Juba in 2012 after Machar began criticizing Kiir and announced he would challenge 
the incumbent in the upcoming 2015 presidential election. In defense, Kiir began reorganizing his 
government, party, and military (Williams, 2017). He replaced the inspector general of the national 
police service, retired over 120 army generals, and dismissed Machar and his entire cabinet. 
Tensions erupted in December 2013 as forces loyal to Machar clashed with forces loyal to Kiir 
(Williams, 2017). What began as a political fight very quickly morphed into an ethnic conflict 
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between the Dinkas, the Nuers, and other ethnic groups. The fighting, which started in Juba, 
quickly spread to Bor, Malakal, and Bentiu and has since affected all ten states of South Sudan 
(IRRI, 2015). In August 2015 a peace agreement was reached by the two ethnic groups and it was 
declared that Machar was to return to Juba and resume his position as vice president. Machar, out 
of fear, insisted on bringing back troops loyal to him, which led to another clash in 2016 that has 
persisted to the present day (Williams, 2017). 
Refugee Law: International and National 
The term ‘refugee’ was first defined in the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of 
Refugees as “someone who is unable or unwilling to return to their country of origin owing to a 
well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a 
particular social group, or political opinion” (p. 3). The document outlines the different rights to 
be granted to refugees. The OAU expanded the definition within a regional context in 1969 in the 
Convention Governing Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa. These two documents 
underlie the legal framework that Uganda has chosen to adopt; addressed in the Refugees Act of 
2006 and the 2010 Refugee Regulations. 
According to the 2006 Act, all asylum seekers granted refugee status shall “receive at least 
the same treatment as is generally accorded to aliens under the Constitution and any other law in 
force in Uganda; and be entitled to privileges that may be granted under the laws of Uganda by 
any administrative agency or organ of the Government” (GoU, 2006, Article 29[1d]). Some of 
these rights include the right to access education beyond primary level; the right to engage in 
agriculture, industry, handicrafts, commerce, and establish commercial and industrial companies; 
the right to practice the profession a refugee holds qualifications for; the right to access 
employment opportunities and engage in gainful employment (GoU, 2006, Article 29[1e]iii-vii). 
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All children are entitled to the rights ascribed to them in the Children Act, the African Charter on 
the Rights and Welfare of the Child, 1981; the Convention on the Rights of the Child, 1989; and 
the Geneva Convention (GoU, 2006, Article 32[2]). Women are entitled to the rights contained in 
the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, 1979; and the 
African Charter on Human and People’s Rights, 1981 (GoU, 2006, Article 33[2]). 
More unique to Uganda, the government has also declared that “the Commissioner shall, 
in collaboration with and the support of non-governmental organizations, the UNHCR, 
international organizations and the international community promote self-reliance among refugees 
and sustainable development in the affected areas” (GoU, 2006, Article 44[2]b). Since the 1990s, 
the GoU has aimed for a Self-Reliance Strategy among refugees (Oliver and Ilcan, 2018). Self-
reliance, as defined by the UNHCR (2017), refers to “the ability of individuals, households, or 
communities to meet their essential needs and enjoy their human rights in a sustainable manner 
and to live with dignity”. Along with self-reliance comes the idea of resilience, “the ability of 
individuals, households, communities, national institutions and systems to prevent, absorb, and 
recover from shocks, while continuing to function and adapt in a way that supports long-term 
prospects for sustainable development, peace and security, and the attainment of human rights” 
(UNHCR, 2017). Refugees are granted a 30x30 meter plot of land via the OPM to use for 
residential and agricultural purposes (Kaiser, 2006). The land typically belongs to the government 
or to the local community, so refugees are only granted user rights (UNDP, 2018). According to 
the same report by the UNDP (2018), 69,336 hectares of land have been allocated to refugees in 
the Northern Uganda. Refugees are encouraged to be self-sufficient through small scale food and 
market production (Olivier and Ilcan, 2018). Thus, the land serves as a supplement to the food aid 
provided by the WFP in refugee settlements. The framework adopted in Uganda is supported and 
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promoted by the UNHCR and WFP who operate with the understanding that food aid has the 
potential to create dependency (Oliver and Ilcan, 2018). 
Uganda as a Host Country 
The UNHCR (2019a) defines a refugee emergency as “any situation in which the life or 
well-being of refugees will be threatened unless immediate and appropriate action is taken, and 
which demands an extraordinary response and exceptional measures” (p. 3). This has manifested 
itself in Uganda, as thousands of individuals have fled, and continue to flee, from South Sudan 
into the country. Since 2013, over 50,000 people have been killed, nearly four million people have 
been driven from their homes, and more than two million have fled to neighboring countries, most 
being women and children (UNHCR, 2018).   
Uganda first began hosting refugees in 1942, accommodating Polish refugees escaping 
violence in Europe during the Second World War. Uganda has since accommodated refugees 
fleeing from ethnic conflicts, political persecutions, or human rights abuses from neighboring 
Sudan, Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of the Congo), Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, and Burundi 
(Pommier, 2014). One of the most significant emergencies in Uganda was in 1989, when 300,000 
refugees from Sudan streamed into Uganda (Pommier, 2014).  
Since then, the northern parts of the country have been housing most of the refugees from 
South Sudan due to their proximity to the border. As tensions in South Sudan continued to escalate, 
the projected number of South Sudanese refugees in the world in 2019 is 2.8 million, increasing 
to 3.14 million in 2020 (UNHCR, 2018). The same regional response plan estimates that Uganda 
will host 1,112,025 refugees from South Sudan by 2020 (UNHCR, 2018).   
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Adjumani District 
Adjumani is still recovering from the decades long conflict between the Lord’s Resistance 
Army and the Government of Uganda (Kaiser, 2006). It is still a relatively poor district, with its 
locals confronting many of the same challenges that the refugees face (IRRI, 2015). This is a 
difficulty the GoU faces not only in Adjumani but throughout the country. Despite being a 
worldwide model of exemplary inclusive refugee settlement policy, Uganda is still a developing 
country struggling to cope with chronic underfunding, strained public services, pressures on 
natural resources, and weak local infrastructure. While refugees have the potential to increase the 
economic activity in the areas they reside in, studies have found that refugee hosting communities 
are often worse off than the national average (GoU, UN, and WB, 2017). These areas are often 
neglected by the national government and instead left in the hands of humanitarian actors who 
have limited resources to tackle broader development issues. The sudden increases in human 
population in the area also affect the quality and availability of services (GoU, UN, and WB, 2017). 
The disparity that exists between northern Uganda and the rest of the country is illustrated in the 
World Bank Uganda Country Partnership Framework (GoU, UN, and WB, 2017). Aware of such 
challenges, Uganda has incorporated refugee management, protection, and development in its 
domestic planning through the NDP II (GoU, UN, & WB, 2017). The document recognizes that 
30% of the humanitarian response for refugees should support the needs of the host communities, 
however, implementation has been limited and “services are often shared and not developed as 
parallel structures” (GoU, UN, and WB, 2017, p. 23). 
Food Security Definitions: Past to Present 
Prior to 1970, food security was considered to simply be food availability at a national or 
regional level (Sseguya, Mazur, and Flora, 2017). Since then the conceptualization of food security 
HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE IN PROTRACTED EMERGENCIES 8 
has evolved considerably. Amartya Sen’s work on famines and poverty illustrated that starvation 
was not due to a lack of food supply but rather due to lack of means to “buy, borrow, or beg for 
it” (Sseguya, Mazur, and Flora, 2017, p. 120). Later discussions on the concept also emphasized 
the importance of stability and quality; ensuring constant access to food that meets the nutritional 
requirements for a healthy and active life. The language used within the discourse of UN 
documents and development policies with regards to food security has shifted from simply 
attaining food availability to a more comprehensive definition that addresses the right to food 
(Olivier and Ilcan, 2018). In 1999, the UN Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights 
adopted a definition that linked the right to adequate food to the dignity of the human person. It 
deemed the former to be “inseparable from social justice, [which requires] the adoption of 
appropriate economic, environmental and social policies, at both the national and international 
levels, oriented to the eradication of poverty and the fulfilment of all human rights for all” (1999, 
paragraph 4). The CESCR also addresses the importance of sustainable access in a manner that 
does not “interfere with the enjoyment of other human rights” (1999, paragraph 8). Sustainability 
must not be undermined or underplayed in a world being threatened by climate change. Food 
security must be accomplished in an environmentally friendly way to ensure that progress is 
sustained, long-term, and not reliant on finite resources. 
According to the 2001 State of Food Insecurity in the World, food security is “a situation 
that exists when all people, at all times, have physical, social and economic access to sufficient, 
safe and nutritious food that meets their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and 
healthy life” (FAO, 2001). This definition is most commonly used today as it accurately reflects 
the four main dimensions of food security: availability, access, utilization, and stability. 
Availability refers to the availability of sufficient quantities of food of appropriate quality (FAO, 
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2008). Access is the ability of individuals to access adequate food for a nutritious diet (FAO, 2008). 
Utilization refers to the proper use of food through adequate diet, clean water, sanitation, and health 
care to reach a state of nutritional well-being where all physiological needs are met (FAO, 2008). 
And stability refers to stability of the other three dimensions over time. Stability requires that an 
individual, household, and a population must have access to adequate food at all times in order to 
be food secure. There should be no risk of losing access to food as soon as there is an external 
shock (let it be environmental, economic…) (FAO, 2008). The right to adequate food is recognized 
in the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights; the 1966 Covenant on Economic Social, and 
Cultural Rights; various international conventions protecting specific groups; various regional 
conventions (such as the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights), and international 
commitments like the UN Sustainable Development Goals, the Rome declaration on World Food 
Security, and the World Food Summit Plan of Action (Oliver and Ilcan, 2018). 
Malnutrition and Hunger 
Malnutrition is an overarching category that encompasses individuals who suffer from 
deficiencies, excesses, or imbalances in intake of energy and/or nutrients (FAO, 2008). Hunger is 
a specific form of malnutrition consisting of prolonged exposure to levels of food intake that 
provide less energy than an individual’s minimum energy requirements (FAO, 2008). All food 
insecure people are not necessarily hungry, some might be lacking specific micronutrients.   
Statement of the Problem 
Refugees in protracted situations don’t receive the same media attention and donor support 
as emergency refugee situations. Yet in the transition from a short-term emergency to a long-term 
emergency, conditions for refugees do not always improve. Funding, if anything, reduces, and 
organizations are left to scramble with the resources they have. Food aid suffers greatly from such 
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cuts and consequently has an effect on food security in the settlement. The GoU self-reliance model 
is supposed to instill resilience in refugees to be able to overcome such shocks, however, this has 
not been the case. Refugees are left in a challenging situation where they become dependent on 
food aid for everyday functioning and long-term survival because they are provided with no 
alternative means to enhance their livelihoods. Yet, if livelihoods were actually improved, refugees 
would be able to escape the dependency trap they are currently caught in and be able to contribute 
more actively in society. Doing so would further the attainment of the SDGs at both a national and 
international level, as well as create conditions for refugees where their human rights are not 
abused.  
Objectives  
The main objective of this study is to assess the impact of humanitarian food assistance on the 
socioeconomic structure of refugee settlements in Adjumani, Uganda. To do so this research will:  
1) Map the procurement, distribution, and consumption framework of food aid in Adjumani 
District  
2) Ascertain the extent to which host communities and refugees are involved in food supply 
for the settlement 
3) Explore the connection between livelihoods and food security 
4) Identify possible solutions to leverage existing gaps between food security and livelihoods 
Justification and Rationale  
Current literature mostly looks at the effects of food aid on food security or the effects of 
food security on livelihood. There is limited research on the links between food aid, food security, 
livelihood, and socioeconomic structures. Studying these forces in isolation ignores the intrinsic 
links and bidirectional relationships that might exist between them. The aim is to see if a link can 
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be identified between food aid and socioeconomic structures to better understand where food aid 
is failing and succeeding in Adjumani. Looking at this more broadly also allows for gaps in 
interventions to be identified and then leveraged. Enhancing livelihoods is imperative not just for 
a normal life but to also increase access to food.  
Secondly, Adjumani is in the West Nile sub-region, which is one of the most food insecure 
regions in the country. The district itself is already facing its own challenges and this research 
wants to explore the possible effects of refugees, both positive (ie. improvement of conditions) 
and negative (ie. adding additional stress to the situation). There is also limited research in 
Adjumani more specifically. Research is necessary to inform future program operations for NGOs 
and national legislation that would most appropriately tailor the needs of both the refugee and host 
community.  
Thirdly, despite chronic underfunding, strained public services, pressures on natural 
resources, and weak local infrastructure, Uganda continues to be a worldwide model of exemplary 
inclusive refugee settlement policy. However, because Uganda continues to be a developing 
country, the country is struggling to meet the demands of all of its refugees as it is struggling to 
meet the needs of all its citizens. A large part of Uganda’s Vision 2040 and NDP II is related to 
improving the livelihoods of refugees and empowering local farmers to enter the global market. 
This would only better Uganda’s reputation as a refugee host country and could encourage policy 
changes around the world. Uganda receives a lot of its funding from international donors, for both 
for refugees and for internal issues. Understanding the hidden side of funding and humanitarian 
aid will allow for more information on socioeconomic access, looking specifically at the four 
pillars of food security: access, availability, safety, and utilization. It is also important to measure 
sustainability to assess the long-term potential of food security in these communities. Furthermore, 
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foreign aid, to a certain extent, is contingent on Uganda achieving the Sustainable Development 
Goals, food security being one of them. Food security, though, is essential for being properly 
nourished, which enhances humans mental and physical health that in turn allows for a more 
productive and enjoyable life.  
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
Introduction 
Prior research focusing specifically on the connection between the state of food security and 
livelihoods is minimal. As a result, this literature review analyzes food security, livelihood, and 
economy in an isolated manner that is distinct to the final report. Furthermore, research in 
Adjumani, specifically, and in Uganda more broadly, is limited. Thus, this current research is 
informed by work that has happened in refugee settlements and camps around the world. 
This literature review will begin by exploring the concept of food security in the refugee 
setting by focusing on current interventions, nutrition, the politics of humanitarian intervention, 
and proper evaluative measuring tools. Then it will delve into the importance of livelihoods and 
economic structures for refugees and conclude by looking at research on the effectiveness of WFP 
interventions.  
Humanitarian Food Assistance in the Refugee Setting 
Current Interventions in Refugee Settlements 
The aid provided by the United Nations when it comes to food is administered via the 
World Food Programme and takes the form of cash-based interventions (CBI) or in-kind food aid. 
Current research has focused on the effectiveness and drawbacks of both types of assistance. 
Among some European and private donors there is a trend towards cash-oriented approaches 
stemming from the observation that households have needs that go beyond food (Maxwell, 2006).  
Haidar (2011) explores common micronutrient deficiencies among food aid beneficiaries 
in Ethiopia. He argues that many sub-Saharan African countries suffer from both macro- and 
micro-nutrient deficiencies caused by poor diets, inadequate diets, and infectious diseases. He 
identifies vitamin-A as the most common deficiency and leading to childhood preventable 
blindness and a contributory factor to child morbidity and mortality from infectious disease. 
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Research specific to blindness in Adjumani found that 146 participants (21%) out of 700 in all 18 
refugee settlements were bilaterally blind, 77 participants (11%) were unilaterally blind (Kawuma, 
2000). The leading causes of blindness were identified to be cataracts (42%), vitamin-A deficiency 
(28%), and trachoma (21%). The prevalence rate of blindness in Adjumani was nearly ten times 
higher than for local Ugandans (Kawuma, 2000). Haidar also discusses the prevalence of iron 
deficiency as organic iron is rarely part of the food aid diets, which tend to be high in fiber. Anemia 
appears to be a severe public health problem with rates ranging from 12.8% to 62.9% depending 
on the settlement (Haidar, 2011). Iron deficiency also affects at least half of all pregnant women 
and young children in developing countries (International Nutrition Foundation, 2006a). Ndemwa 
et al. (2011) further elaborates that anemia is often related to deficiencies of vitamin A, folic acid, 
and vitamin B12. He argues that overall the “main cause of micronutrient deficiencies in 
developing countries is a poor-quality diet that is largely plant-based, with limited inclusion of 
animal- source foods and fortified food products” (Ndemwa et al. 2011, p 286). This is the type of 
diets that refugees often eat. The same study found that fortification of food improves iron status, 
even in malaria-endemic areas.   
Haidar’s findings are supported by a broader study by the International Nutrition 
Foundation (2006) on micronutrient fortification. It is explained that deficiencies in micronutrients 
are “largely invisible but often devastating” (p. 67). Such deficiencies make someone more 
susceptible to infectious diseases, impairs both physical and mental development, lowers labor 
productivity, and increases risk of premature death. It points specifically to WFP beneficiary 
populations who are already lacking sufficient food. These beneficiaries suffer more the more they 
become dependent on a limited range of food as they begin to lack key nutrients for extended 
periods of time. Prevalence data from the World Health Organization for micronutrient problems 
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in “the countries supported by WFP suggest that roughly 4 million women and young children are 
vitamin A deficient, almost 7 million schoolchildren face iodine deficiency, while 7 million 
women of child-bearing age are anemic” (UN, 2006, p. 69 ). While this does not point specifically 
and solely to refugee populations, refugees are the main benefactors of WFP aid, especially for 
long periods of time. The WFP pays attention to such challenges by focusing on micronutrients in 
ration planning, delivering fortified foods (such as oil or skim milk), relying on locally produced 
and fortified commodities in low income food deficit countries, and by advocating for fortification 
policies at national and international levels. Micronutrient deficiencies cannot be ignored when 
studying food security and livelihoods as “huge economic losses result from human resource 
depletion linked to ill-health, lowered intellectual capacity, and early death” (UN, 2006, p. 68).  
Looking specifically at cash-based interventions, Grijalva-Eternod et al. (2018) conducted 
a study on the effects of CBI on the risk of malnutrition in children between 6 and 59 months by 
comparing malnutrition measurements in 10 camps receiving CBI and 10 camps that were not. 
The study took place in internally displaced person camps in peri-urban Mogadishu, Somalia. IDPs 
were provided with $84.00 USD for 5 months, a once-only distribution of a non-food items kid, 
and the provision of piped water free of charge. Researchers found that CBI improved diet diversity 
in households not just for children but for mothers and primary care givers also. There was also an 
apparent improvement in food security. However, the improvement did not correlate with a 
reduction in risk of children in CBI camps becoming malnourished, which illustrates the complex 
causes of malnutrition as well as the importance of comprehensive interventions. The findings of 
the study are limited by the fact that CBI was allocated to camps based on vulnerability, which 
makes interpreting malnutrition more complicated. Furthermore, the IDPs were receiving two 
times the amount of cash that refugees in Uganda receive, meaning that the effects might not be 
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exactly the same. It also takes place in a peri-urban area, which is distinct to rural Adjumani 
district.  
Basu et al. (2018) conducted a study on the potential of reducing chronic disease through 
changes in food aid among Palestinian refugees in the Middle East. Their findings indicated that 
transitioning from traditional food aid to cash does not necessarily reduce chronic disease 
outcomes, which differs from previous literature. Similary to Grijalva-Eternod et al., Basu et al. 
forces us to think more deeply about the effects of aid on both health and consequently on 
socioeconomic structures.  
Hagen-Zanker et al. (2018) examined both direct and indirect effects of UNHCR cash 
transfer in the context of protracted displacement in Jordan. CBI allowed refugees to overcome 
financial barriers, which allowed them to access goods and services such as medical clinics, 
uniforms, stationary for school… Refugees were also able to invest in assets or skills needed for 
work and travel expenses necessary to reach work. Receiving steady cash every month allows 
refugees to feel more relaxed about any other household income, which is a characteristic of cash 
described as “fungibility” by Hagen-Zanker et al. (2018). Cash reduces the need of refugees to 
resort to harmful coping mechanisms as household needs can be met more regularly. The fact that 
cash transfer increased access to shelter, health, employment had a positive impact on mental well-
being as refugees’ perceptions of themselves and their potential improved. It also allowed for 
children, especially young boys, to remain in school rather than dropping out to pursue income-
generating activities. Thus, the economic outcomes are closely intertwined with the social 
outcomes. Despite being conducted in Jordan, this study highlights the importance of physical and 
social security for improved livelihoods and points to the connection that exists between 
humanitarian food aid and socioeconomic structures in refugee camps. This is an essential 
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foundation for this study as it aims to explore the link between food aid and livelihood more 
closely, looking both at the positive and the negative aspects. The researchers identified a very 
pressing challenge: research tends to focus on short-term assistance on supporting food security 
and thus there is limited evidence exploring the effectiveness of humanitarian interventions in 
protracted situations (Hagen-Zanker et al., 2018). This is a problem that this current research 
attempts to combat as it will be looking at food security in protracted situations.  
In contrast to the aforementioned studies, Karuhanga (2018) did a comparative study of 
nutritional outcomes on children aged 6-59 months in households receiving cash and households 
receiving dry food rations in Rwamwanja Refugee Settlement in Western Uganda. The prevalence 
of stunting in children receiving cash was 46.7% and 49.4% in those receiving food. The 
prevalence of underweight children was 19.6% for those receiving cash and 25.3% for those 
receiving food. The prevalence of wasting was 2.1% for participants receiving cash and 3.5% for 
participants receiving food. Overall, the prevalence of stunting was high in the settlement and 
unconditional cash transfers helped with diet diversification. Karuhanga (2018) recommends the 
promotion of cash transfers as she argues it was preferred by most households. This study helps 
set a base understanding of the contrast between food aid and cash assistance to inform some the 
questions participants will be asked. It also informs some of the observation criteria to be used 
while looking out for signs of stunting, wasting, and underweight children.  Maxwell (2007) 
explores the idea of the complementarity of food and cash, saying that a mix of the two would be 
very useful, however, would not come without significant challenges.  
Measuring Food Security 
Similarly, to the definition of food security, measurement tools and strategies have also 
evolved over time. It is important to understand the underlying construct of different measurement 
HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE IN PROTRACTED EMERGENCIES 18 
tool to properly determine which metric should be used (Jones et al., 2013). No single measurement 
can capture every possible dimension of food security. Thus, an approach must be selected based 
on the purpose of the study being conducted. When the wrong tool is used, researchers might find 
themselves measuring an unintended domain of food security, measuring multiple dimensions 
without the ability to differentiate between them, collect irrelevant data for their sample, collect 
data at an inappropriate scale, selecting a tool that requires resources beyond those available for 
adequate data collection and analysis (Jones et al., 2013). This literature review examines various 
measurement tools to inform the most appropriate tool for the methodology of this study.  
Initially researchers used agricultural production surveys, intra-household food frequency 
interviews, and anthropometric surveys for underage children, however these failed to consider all 
the dimensions of food security (Sseguya, Mazur, and Flora, 2017). The current measurement 
approaches fall under four categories: dietary diversity and food frequency, consumption behavior 
and coping strategies in times of shocks, self-assessments, and experiential measures (Jones et al., 
2013).  
At a national level, measurements monitor changes in macrolevel trends (Jones et al., 
2013). The Global Hunger Index measures hunger using three indicators: child undernourishment, 
child underweightedness, and child mortality (Jones et al., 2013). The Global Food Security Index 
uses 30 indicators within three domains of food security: affordability (6), availability (10), and 
quality and safety (10) (Jones et al., 2013). The Famine Early Warning Systems Network was 
developed by USAID to produce monthly food security updates for 25 countries that the US works 
with (Jones et al., 2013). In 2004, the FAO’s Food Security and Nutrition Analysis Unit (FSNAU) 
developed the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification to improve food security and nutrition 
analysis to better inform decision making. It is a common framework used for classifying the 
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severity and magnitude of food insecurity and identifying the key factors on a macro level within 
a given region. The IPC Classification System distinguishes the following five severity phases of 
acute food insecurity: (1) minimal/none, (2) stressed, (3) crisis, (4) emergency, (5) 
catastrophe/famine (FAO, 2008). It also identifies four severity levels of chronic food insecurity: 
(1) minimal or no CFI, (2) mild CFI, (3) moderate CFI, (4) severe CFI (FAO, 2008). The indicators 
used for such calculations are: crude mortality rate, malnutrition prevalence, food 
access/availability, dietary diversity, water access/availability, coping strategies, and livelihood 
assets (FAO, 2008). This method relies on the subjective interpretation by experts rather than on 
model-based figures (Jones et al., 2013). This research will rely on the IPC Classification System 
as it can isolate areas within a country more than the other national indicator tools. Doing so will 
allow this study to look at food security specifically in the region of Adjumani in Northern Uganda 
to help identify the state of food security more broadly in the district before zoning into refugees 
specifically.  
When looking at household food insecurity, experiential measures are the best strategy to 
appropriately capture information (Sseguya, Mazur, and Flora, 2017). The Coping Strategies Index 
(CSI) was developed by CARE International and the WFP and is a series of questions regarding 
how households cope with food shortfalls that is followed up by focus groups. The questionnaire 
constructs a numeric score that can be used for targeting food aid, assessing the impact of food 
aid, and estimating long term changes related to food security (Jones et al., 2013).  The tool is 
particularly applicable to Uganda as it is one of the three countries where it was initially designed 
(Maxwell and Caldwell, 2008). They explain that it is an “appropriate tool for emergency 
situations when other methods are not practical or timely” as coping strategies can be easily 
observed (Maxwell and Caldwell, 2008, pg. 1). The CSI is based off of the possible answers to the 
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question: “What do you do when you don’t have adequate food, and don’t have the money to buy 
food?” (Maxwell and Caldwell, 2008, pg. 2). The first few days researchers identify a list with the 
main set of coping strategies in the area, it is not inclusive of every single strategy but one that 
represents the consensus of all groups interviewed (12-15 at most) (Maxwell and Caldwell, 2008). 
The WFP’s experience with CSI has shown that there are usually four types of consumption coping 
strategies: changes in diet, increase food supply by using short-term strategies that are not 
sustainable over long periods of time, reduce the number of people they have to feed, rationing the 
food available in the house (Maxwell & Caldwell, 2008). Strategies can be both short-term and 
long-term, but research seems to indicate that the management of short-term consumption is an 
accurate indicator of acute food security (Coates, Swindale, and Bilinsky, 2007; Maxwell and 
Caldwell, 2008). Changes in behavior also reflect the judgement of household heads in making 
decisions about their future. Having identified the main strategies, researchers then ask how often 
these are employed in the recent past and determine a severity level for each coping strategy. 
Frequency is a measure of how many days a household has had to use each strategy in the last 
week (never = 0, every day = 7). Severity can be broken up into 3 levels (most severe = 3, least 
severe = 1). Frequency and severity scores are individually weighted and then summed up across 
the list of all identified behaviors to determine and index score. The higher the score, the greater 
the level of coping and, inevitably, the more food insecurity in the house.  
The most comprehensive measurement tool used to measure household food insecurity is 
the Household Food Insecurity Access Scale (HFIAS), which consists of an 18-item questionnaire 
focusing on household food security within a given time frame (Sseguya, Mazur, and Flora, 2017). 
The method is “based on the idea that the experience of food insecurity causes predictable reactions 
and responses that can be captured and quantified through a survey and summarized in a scale” 
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(Coates, Swindale, and Bilinsky, 2007, p. 1). The questions uncover the underlying conditions or 
behaviors in the households relating to anxiety about food budget and supply, quality and quantity 
of food, reduced intake by adults and children, consequences of reduced intake, and feelings of 
shame (Coates, Swindale, and Bilinsky, 2007). The scale has been tested and validified in many 
countries allowing for it to be applied cross-culturally (Sseguya, Mazur, and Flora, 2017). 
The questionnaire consists of two-types of related questions: occurrence questions and 
frequency-of-occurrence questions. Responses to the questions are coded. Occurrence questions 
asks whether a specific condition associated with food insecurity has occurred in a given time 
frame (for example, the past four weeks). Individuals respond with no (=0) or yes (=1). If the 
participants respond with a no, researchers proceed to the following question. If the participant 
responds with a yes, researchers ask the follow-up frequency-of-occurrence question. This type of 
question asks how often the condition reported in the previous question happened in the given time 
frame. Individuals can respond with rarely (=1), sometimes (=2), and often (=3). Researchers must 
determine what will constitute rarely, sometimes, and often within the time frame. Once the 
participant has responded to the frequency-of-occurrence question, the researchers can move on to 
the following occurrence question and repeat the aforementioned process. Once all 9 occurrence 
questions have been asked, with the necessary follow-up, a HFIAS score variable is calculated for 
each household. The variable is the sum of the codes for each frequency-of-occurrence question. 
The frequency-of-occurrence for occurrence questions answered with a no are counted as 0. The 
maximum score for a household is 27 and the minimum score is 0. The higher the score the more 
food insecurity the household experienced (Coates, Swindale, and Bilinsky, 2007). 
Both the CSI and the HFIAS provide valuable information that is pertinent to this current 
research. However, due to limited time and limited initial rapport with refugees, using both 
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questionnaires did not seem like it would be the most efficient use of interview time. As this is my 
first-time researching food security, I decided to employ the HFIAS fully as the questionnaire is 
more comprehensive and provides suggested weighting for the results. The CSI relies on a 
subjective ranking of initial coping strategies and severity scores, which could undermine the 
validity of the research if done wrong. Given the preliminary nature of this study, using CSI might 
result in certain coping strategies not being discussed or mentioned due to the reliance of the 
preliminary list. Furthermore, time might not allow for multiple focus groups and thus, I did not 
want to rely on a method that depended on such methodology. That said, one of my interview 
questions will be the CSI guiding question. The HFIAS looks at some of the coping mechanisms 
and asks for frequency measures.  
Table 1: Household Food Insecurity Access Scale 
In the last month…  
1- Did you worry that your household would not have enough food? 
0 – No (skip to question 2) 
1 – Yes (proceed to 1a) 
 à 1a – How often did this occur? 
1. Rarely 
2. Sometimes 
3. Often 
2- Were you or any household member not able to eat the kinds of foods you preferred because of a 
lack of resources?  
3- Did you or any household member have to eat a limited variety of foods due to a lack of resources?  
4- Did you or any household member have to eat some foods that you really did not want to eat 
because of a lack of resources to obtain other types of food?  
5- Did you or any household member have to eat a smaller meal than you felt you needed because 
there was not enough food? 
6- Did you or any household member have to eat fewer meals in a day because there was not enough 
food? 
7- Was there ever no food to eat of any kind in your household because of lack of resources to get 
food? 
8- Did you or any household member go to sleep at night hungry because there was not enough food? 
9- Did you or any household member go a whole day and night without eating anything because there was not 
enough food?  
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The Politics of Humanitarian Intervention 
Demands for humanitarian responses and aid have grown as protracted internal civil 
conflict around the world continues to displace large numbers of people. However, they have not 
been able to deliver in the way originally promised and are currently facing a number of critiques. 
The main problem, addressed by Oliver and Ilcan (2018), is that the internationally recognized 
right to food is often dismissed as ‘assistance’ in the practices of international refugee protection. 
There is an irony that the same institution who creates and supposedly upholds international human 
rights, including socioeconomic ones depends on a “minimalist understanding of human rights (the 
right to live and survive)” when it comes to humanitarian efforts (Oliver and Ilcan, 2018). The 
International Nutrition Foundation (2006b) very clearly expresses this point, explaining that the 
overarching goal of emergency operations is to save life. However, it seems that as emergency 
situations become protracted situations, little changes in the perceived mentality of such 
organizations. The same study by the International Nutrition Foundation (2006b) outlines the three 
crucial elements to successful humanitarian action, with regards to food security: (1) ensuring 
nutritionally-appropriate food basket formulated on local needs that arrives on time and in a 
coordinated manner; (2) coupling food with essential non-food inputs such as local milling and 
fortification, local procurement, and support for nutrition activities; (3) better linking of emergency 
programming with non-emergency activities. The longer the inadequacies in food consumption 
last, the higher malnutrition rates will be (International Nutrition Foundation, 2006b). Despite the 
commitment of the WFP to such goals, their objective to provide nutritional support to vulnerable 
individuals not just with food aid but also with different interventions to correct malnutrition, and 
their adaptation of a ration planning figure of 2100 kcal per person in 1997, they have failed to 
always deliver as promised (International Nutritional Foundation, 2006b).  
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International organizations are criticized for ignoring the more expansive aspects of food 
security like accessibility and sustainability and for upholding a neoliberal economic 
understanding of inequality that propagates the global food regime that now dominates the world 
(Oliver and Ilcan, 2018). The neoliberal corporate-based food regime emphasizes the capitalist 
transformation of agriculture; which requires mechanization, chemicalization, land concentration, 
hydrocarbon farm inputs, biotechnologies, and commodification of seed production (Martiniello, 
2015). This cannot be fairly expected of countries that are yet to undergo full industrial 
development.  
In June 2016, the WFP was forced to reduce its rations by 50%. Exceptions were made for 
those who were considered vulnerable, but this has caused to some tensions among refugees (WFP, 
2016). They needed about $117 million to get to December but were lacking $65 million (Okiror, 
2017). In 2017 the UNHCR announced that funding had only covered 32% of the $674 million 
requested to help refugees in Uganda (Patinkin, 2017). Some desperate families were actually 
driven back to the countries they fled from and end up dying as a result (Patinkin, 2017). In Bidi 
Bidi, food cuts resulted in refugees breaking the gate of the WFP main store, looted food, destroyed 
documents and other properties, and physically harmed staff of the UNHCR and WFP (Ariaka, 
2018). Oliver and Ilcan (2018) explains such cuts by pointing to the economic logic efficiency and 
short-term planning of humanitarian practices. They claim that the WFP is dominated by a free-
market model of aid that is profit-driven rather than humanitarian driven. Protected refugee 
situations are disadvantaged as they tend to be neglected in favor of high-profile emergencies that 
dominate the media and tend to be more lucrative, in terms of reputation, for donors. Current 
humanitarian responses are not geared towards financial sustainability, even when they attempt to 
include host community (GoU, UN, and WB, 2017).  
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Funding tends to be short-term, which limits long-term planning. Funding is also 
inconsistent due to the emphasis placed on donors’ sectoral priorities, the link between agricultural 
supply in OECD donor countries and international market conditions, and reductions in donor 
commitments to food assistance (GoU, UN, and WB, 2017). Thus, humanitarian efforts are 
operating alongside the UNHCR’s limited capacity to deliver proper protection and resulting in 
food insecurity, contemptible housing, and unsustainable employment (Oliver and Ilcan, 2018). 
Maxwell (2007) further explores donor trends and notes an overall decline in food aid over the 
years. This is, in part, due to the emphasis being placed on emergencies. Thus, there is a marked 
decline in government-to-government aid or ‘programme’ food aid (Maxwell, 2007). Competition 
for resources also continues to increase among countries needing supplies. To cover the gap in 
donor funding, the FAO, WFP, and UNHCR have begun to prioritize agricultural livelihood 
programs throughout refugee settlements and camps in Sub-Saharan Africa. They promote and 
encourage such programs world-wide by touting all the benefits of self-reliance. As a result, 
refugees are being expected to become “self-reliant” in an environment where they face social and 
economic isolation, unpredictable climates, poor soil conditions, and extreme poverty. Agencies 
and workers are also constrained by “systemic corruption, apathy, inefficiencies, donor fatigue, 
and decreasing donor interest” (Oka, 2011, p. 239).   
The Strategic Framework for Refugee and Host Community Empowerment also points to 
a “fundamental dichotomy between humanitarian and development responses for any given 
location” (GoU, UN, WB, 2017). A handout culture still persists, especially in protracted refugee 
situations (GoU, UN, WB, 2017). The implications of all this on Uganda are particularly strong as 
the country itself is trying to develop while accommodating for the needs of over a million 
refugees. Humanitarian action often displaces any kinds of efforts geared towards strengthening 
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the government’s ability to deliver services. There is also a lot of duplication in the coordination 
of humanitarian efforts and development efforts, despite the GoU’s attempts to mitigate the 
disconnect between the two (GoU, UN, WB, 2017). This is only heightened by the fragmented 
manner in which humanitarian organizations operate. There is a lack of coordination amongst these 
groups, leading to lost opportunities for greater efficiency and value for money. The lessons 
learned by one organization are not effectively captured and shared and thus are not able to 
properly inform overall improvements. Maxwell (2007) further elaborates on this by explaining 
how “programmatically, between ‘relief’ and ‘development’ there is an emergent grey area around 
social protection and safety nets” (p S30). He points to Ethiopia where governments have made 
huge efforts to separate chronically vulnerable groups from disaster-affected populations. The 
former is seen as a safety net issue and the latter as a humanitarian issue. The result is that all 
interventions in the safety-net category are seen as relatively predictable, providing more incentive 
for donors as they can allocate resources without “waiting for assessments and appeals” (Maxwell, 
2007, p S30). However, for humanitarian responses, there is unpredictability which reduces the 
appeal to donors and slows down the process of humanitarian response.   
Finally, Maxwell (2007) elaborates on the role of food aid governance on the foreseeable 
future of food aid. He explains that food aid policies are being reviewed and undergoing changes 
due to issues within the WTO based on the debate over export subsidies. Other problems being 
discussed in the WTO have to do with the form of food aid (loans, grants…) and sourcing. The 
European Union and Canada have untied their food aid, meaning they offer loans for local 
procurement. However, the US remains tied to its own domestic market. Codes of conduct for 
operation are also undergoing constant negotiations regarding the allocation of aid on the basis of 
need, vulnerability, and impartiality rather than on geopolitical or commercial interests; operations 
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backed with proper analysis and research; appropriate utilization and management of resources; 
clarity of obligations and accountability of stakeholders (Maxwell, 2007, p. S29). It is important 
to consider the political aspects of food aid to help ground what is observed in the field in an 
international context and understand how aid efforts go beyond the implementing agencies that 
one actually sees on the ground operating.  
Food Security 
Refugee Settlements 
Despite all the initiatives in place by the OPM, UNHCR, WFP, and their corresponding 
implementing and operating partners, literature seems to indicate that the state of food security in 
camps is grim. The FAO highlights two types of food insecurity. The first, chronic food insecurity, 
occurs when “people are unable to meet their minimum food requirements over a sustained period 
of time” (FAO, 2008). Transitory food insecurity occurs when there is “a sudden drop in the ability 
to produce or access enough food to maintain a good nutritional status” (FAO, 2008). Refugees 
are facing both. 
Refugees have reported inadequate, monotonous, and poor food quality (IRRI, 2015; 
Oliver and Ilcan, 2018). A UNHCR official in Nakivale was recorded saying “WFP food is not 
enough to sustain a family for a whole month” (Oliver and Ilcan, 2018, p. 453). Due to the increase 
in numbers of refugees in settlements and reductions in funding, food rations have been halved in 
some parts of the country (Meyer et al., 2019). Yet, the land allocated to refugees is not large 
enough to properly supplement rations and ration cuts. The soil has become exhausted and as 
family size increases, land size does not (Kaiser, 2006; UNDP, 2018). There have been limited 
improvements in technology beyond better seeds and there is limited reported use of fertilizers and 
irrigation (UNDP, 2018). The weather is also unpredictable and there is unreliable rainfall, floods, 
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and droughts (UNDP, 2018). Food distribution tents have long queue as people wait to receive 
porridge (Imvepi, 2017). It also becomes hard for people to depend on unreliable food aid (Okiror, 
2017). According to New Vision, women are being battered by their husbands whenever their food 
rations run out. Refugees also claim that the food ration is not enough for the entire month 
(Masinde, 2017). Nakivale refugees sold some of their food supply at local markets in order to 
purchase other essential household items like soap and sugar (Oliver and Ilcan 2018).  
Refugees express a desire to want to be able to support themselves but fail to break out of the 
situation of dependency they find themselves in (IRRI, 2015). Many of them possess skills that 
would allow them to generate income but lack the capital to begin a business or access employment 
opportunities (IRRI, 2015; Kaiser, 2006). The fact that camps are located in remote areas further 
hinders accessibility to large markets.  
Uganda 
 According to the IPC Chronic Food Insecurity Analysis concluded in February 2015, 
Uganda is classified as level 3: moderate CFI, except for Karamoja which was classified as level 
4, and the Central region, which was classified as level 2 (Uganda IPC Technical Working Group, 
2015). The West Nile sub-region, where Adjumani is located, is classified as level 3. The 
breakdown is as follows: 40% level 1, 31% level 2, 17% level 3, and 12% level 4.  According to a 
study by the FAO in Northern Uganda, the biggest challenge for locals is access to water and crop 
productivity. They also lack access to a market to sell their products, which leads to crop losses 
and economic stagnation. The largest challenge for refugees in the region is access to land. 
Refugees are more food insecure and strongly reliant on assistance as a main source (FAO and 
OPM, 2018). However, refugee households perceive themselves to be more resilient than host 
communities (FAO and OPM, 2018). According to an IPC report, in Western Uganda there is a 
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“tendency, among the population, to sell of produce at the expense of domestic consumption” 
(Uganda IPC Technical Working Group, 2015). The underlying issues in Uganda are weak 
enforcement of policies and laws, poor extension services, depletion of natural resources, lack of 
post-harvest facilities, and poor road infrastructure. Specifically, the eastern part of this region is 
a cattle corridor that is “usually affected by drought and dry spell conditions that tend to affect the 
livestock keepers in this region” (Uganda IPC Technical Working Group, 2015).  
Local Food Procurement 
Maxwell (2007) identified a slow shift towards local procurement for food aid and argues 
in its favor. If properly managed, local and regional purchase has more advantages than food 
shipped in from abroad. The short shipping distances allow for a quicker response in emergencies, 
is more cost-efficient, can help address the shortfall in resources, reduces distortions on market 
prices, and helps support development objectives. However, local and regional food aid might not 
have these same effects if it is not well organized and managed (Maxwell, 2007). Maxwell (2007) 
reminds us that “local procurement is not a panacea for all that ails food aid, but it is certainly an 
increasingly important means of procurement with the potential to have important secondary 
developmental impacts (p. S31). 
Food Sovereignty 
The concept of food sovereignty initially emerged in the 1990s through La Vía Campesina, 
a peasant organization, at the Rome Civil Society Organization Forum (Anderson, 2018). It is a 
condition for achieving food security and is defined by the Food Sovereignty Framework as “the 
Right of peoples, communities, and countries to define their own agricultural, labour, fishing, food 
and land policies, which are ecologically, socially, economically and culturally appropriate to their 
unique circumstances. It includes the true right to food and to produce food, which means that all 
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people have the right to safe, nutritious and culturally appropriate food and to food producing 
resources and the ability to sustain themselves and their societies” (Glipo and Pascual Jr, 2005). 
The main goal of La Vía Campesina was to empower individuals to organize their societies in 
ways that “transcend the neoliberal vision of a world of commodities, markets, and selfish 
economic actors” (Anderson, 2018, p. 1). It is deemed to be a “concept in action” and consists of 
six pillars (Górdillo and Jerónimo, 2013):  
“(1) food for the people by: (a) placing the need for food at the center of policies and 
(b) insisting that food is more than just a commodity; (2) values food providers by: (a) 
supporting sustainable livelihoods; and b) respecting the work of all food providers; 
(3) localizes food systems by: a) reducing the distance between suppliers and 
consumers; b) rejecting dumping and inappropriate food aid; and c) resisting 
dependence on remote and unaccountable corporations; (4) places control at a local 
level by: a) placing control in the hands of local food suppliers; b) recognizing the need 
to inhabit and share territories; and c) rejecting the privatization of natural resources; 
(5) promotes knowledge and skills by: a) building on traditional knowledge; b) using 
research to support and pass on this knowledge to future generations; and c) rejecting 
technologies that undermine local food systems; and (6) works with nature by: a) 
maximizing the contributions of ecosystems; b) improving resilience; and c) rejecting 
energy intensive, monocultural, industrialized and destructive production methods.”  
It is often discussed in a Ugandan context as Uganda is labelled as the potential breadbasket of 
Africa (Martiniello, 2015). 76-84% of the population is engaged in agriculture-based livelihoods, 
women produce 80% of the food consumed nationally, it is very rich in natural resources, allows 
for a variety of crops to be grown (Martiniello, 2015). It aligns with Uganda’s 2040 vision that 
aims to transform Uganda from a low-income agriculture-based country into a modern middle-
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income country driven by service and industry (Makerere lecturer, personal communication, 
March 7, 2019). The goal, ultimately, is to transform agriculture into a more efficient and 
productive sector; and to expand the production of export crops where Uganda has a comparative 
advantage (Martiniello, 2015). 
This literature review briefly addresses food sovereignty in the context of refugee 
settlements in Uganda as it is, essentially, the underlying goal that to OPM and UNHCR aim to 
achieve with their self-reliance strategy, especially as refugees who are deemed to be food secure 
are slowly weaned off of food aid.  
Livelihoods 
Livelihoods generally refers to “the means used to maintain and sustain life” (Jacobsen, 
2002, p. 98) and means “connotes the resources, including household assets, capital, social 
institutions, and networks, and the strategies available to people through their local and 
transnational communities” (Jacobsen, 2002, p. 98). Modern discourse related to the subject now 
focuses on the importance of sustainability when it comes to livelihoods. However, according to 
Jacobsen the definition must be adapted to emphasize the vulnerability of people exposed to 
violence and displacement, in the context of refugees. Jacobsen coins the term livelihoods in 
conflict and explains it “de-emphasizes the sustainability part of the livelihoods framework and 
emphasizes the need to reduce the vulnerability and risk that are a result of conflict” (Jacobsen, 
2002, p. 98). It must focus on how people are able to access and mobilize resources in order to 
increase their economic security and pursue necessary goals. Despite facing similar challenges as 
their hosts, they differ in terms of the resources available to them, their livelihood goals, and the 
available strategies for achieving them. That said, refugees do have their own unique resources 
such as transnational resources provided by other refugees, social capital from specific refugee 
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networks, unique information flows, skills not available in the host community, and greater 
humanitarian and in-kind assistance.   
As already exemplified by research on the WFP’s local procurement strategy and P4P 
strategy, income generating activities are essential for escaping the semi-subsistence poverty trap 
that ravages much of rural Africa. These same benefits and challenges manifest themselves in 
refugee settlements as displaced people face deep and chronic problems of poverty and insecurity 
(Jacobsen, 2002). Yet despite increases in agricultural production in different parts of Sub-Saharan 
Africa, the average per capita daily caloric food availability is below the 2500kcal that is 
recommended for developing countries (Sseguya, Mazur, and Flora, 2017). Hunger and poverty 
are interconnected and cannot be discussed comprehensively in isolation of one another. 
Malnutrition is an underlying force of perpetual poverty as it inhibits an individual’s ability to 
engage in productive work and poverty limits a person’s chances of accessing food. Achieving 
food security is more complex than simply increasing food supply as that does not necessarily 
eliminate poverty, end hunger, and improve nutrition. Low educational status, poor social capital, 
low household income, and unemployment are all associated with food security on a global scale 
(Sseguya, Mazur, and Flora, 2017).  
 The UNHCR and the GoU’s focus on self-reliance and resilience are important elements 
of creating improved livelihoods for refugees. However, research also points to the dangers of such 
model and looks at the effects that has on refugees. Schiltz et al. (2019) explores the different 
narratives of refugee’s future dreams and hopes and finds that during the first two years, most 
refugees hope for better, tangible opportunities were repeatedly disappointed. Their ambitions then 
became grounded in an imaginary, often supernatural power. According to Bourdieu their 
imagined futures “oscillated between fantasy and surrender, between flight into the imaginary and 
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fatalistic surrender to the verdicts of the given” (Bourdieu, 2000, p. 221). Traditional projects 
focusing on livelihoods in the camps don’t always include future projects (Schiltz et al., 2019). 
The piece cites various authors that argue that “self-reliance and resilience are manifestations of a 
neoliberal mode of governance, which fosters individuals and institutions that can endure, and 
perhaps even embrace, situations of naturalized risk and uncertainty” (Schiltz et al., 2019, p. 47). 
However, the research also cites authors that argue that there is no connection between resilience 
thinking and neoliberal governance. These authors argue that the flaws are within specific contexts 
rather than with the policy as a whole. Such approaches are “manifestations of the unpredictability 
of aid and chroming underfunding” (Schiltz et al., 2019, p. 48). Regardless, Schiltz et al. (2019) 
argue that future visions of resilience and self-reliance are dominated by visions of a future with 
no progress, or a future based solely on chance. The ability to be self-reliant, ironically, is 
determined by the practical and funding of organizations. The researchers advocate for 
organizations to engage with future dreams of refugees rather than rely on futures contingent of 
external factors that force refugees into a permanent state of temporariness. There needs to be a 
middle ground between opportunities offering the bare minimum (such as cultivating crops) and 
highly-unlikely dreams (such as resettlement to a third country) (Schiltz et al., 2019). Currently, 
the system fosters feelings of powerlessness. This sets an important foundation for my work, as it 
points to the intrinsic connection that exists between organizations and future possibilities for 
refugees. Despite the dream of self-reliance, it must start somewhere, and that start is more often 
than not defined by humanitarian support available. My research aim is to more specifically 
identify the limitations of humanitarian assistance on improving livelihoods, linking food aid to 
social structures.  
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Research by Sseguya, Mazur, and Flora (2017) further elaborates how social networks, 
which are linked to livelihoods, can enhance food security. Using data obtained from rural Uganda, 
the researchers identified dimensions of social capital that were critical for enhancing food 
security. They define social capital as “networks, norms, and trust that people have available for 
productive purposes” (Sseguya, Mazur, and Flora, 2017, p. 119) and as multidimension. It can take 
on two forms, structural and cognitive. Structural forms relate to roles, rules, procedures, and 
precedents with the aim of facilitating collective action. Cognitive forms point to norms, values, 
attitudes, and beliefs to predispose people to cooperate. These can be manifested at a micro- 
(individual), meso- (community), or macro- (national or regional) level. Social capital can occur 
in the form of bonding, bridging, and linking. Bonding describes “the relationships among people 
of similar ethnicity, social statues, and location and refers to social cohesion within the group and 
community” (Sseguya, Mazur, and Flora, 2017, p. 119). Bridging refers to “relationships and 
networks which cross social groupings, involving coordination or collaboration with other groups, 
external associations, mechanisms of social support or information sharing across communities 
and group” (Sseguya, Mazur, and Flora, 2017, p. 119). Linking “describes the ability of groups or 
individuals to engage with external agencies and those in positions of influence, either to draw on 
useful resources or to influence policies” (Sseguya, Mazur, and Flora, 2017, p. 119).  
The researchers found that participation in groups of at least one household member was a 
strong indicator of social capital and was a result of bridging and linking social capital. In terms 
of food security, they identified that cognitive bonding social capital and bridging and linking 
social capital (both structural and cognitive) distinguished food secure and food insecure 
households. Bonding was critical for bringing people with similar characteristics together to work 
towards a common good. Norms of trust and reciprocity, shared attitudes on solidarity, helpfulness 
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and fairness facilitated the creation of a conductive cooperative environment where individuals 
could benefit from one another. Education and training were identified as important supplements 
to social capital. Household heads with high levels of formal education were more likely to be 
food secure (Sseguya, Mazur, and Flora, 2017). The conclusion to be drawn from this is the 
importance for development organizations and practitioners focusing on food security to 
emphasize bonding social capital amongst local farmers and other community groups. Education 
must be encouraged as higher education levels resulted in greater participation in community 
activities, which result in building social networks and social capital. Participation is imperative 
as those who are not involved do not benefit from any spillover effects (Sseguya, Mazur, and Flora, 
2017). This illustrates the importance not only of social capital, but also of livelihood activities 
themselves to increase feelings of positivity associated with staying in the settlement.  
 A study was conducted in Kiryandongo and Adjumani in November 2016, after an influx 
of refugees from South Sudan, focusing on their perceptions of humanitarian support (Meyer et 
al., 2019). Refugees, more specifically adolescents and caregivers, viewed the influx as impacting 
their access to basic needs, which in turn had impacts on adolescent psychosocial well-being. The 
increase in numbers in refugees resulted in reductions of food rations and changes in access and 
quality of services. There were reductions in menstrual hygiene products, overcrowding in schools, 
and worse performance. There was also decreased access to other basic needs such as clean water, 
soap, clothing, cooking materials, and housing (Meyer et al., 2019). The effects went beyond the 
physical ones. It also affected psychosocial well-being as adolescents began doubting their parents 
due to the new household stress and fell sick to depression. Furthermore, due to irritability and 
frustration there was an increase in caregiver use of violence against adolescents as food security 
declined (Meyer et al., 2019). This study contributes to understanding the relationship that can 
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exist between food aid, dependency on it, and social structures in refugee settlements. My research 
will not focus on the psychosocial aspect but will address the effects of humanitarian assistance 
on general well-being in the camp, looking beyond just food security.   
Economic Structures in Refugee Settlements 
The effects of food aid transcend health and social aspects of refugee life, they also strongly 
manifest themselves into the economy, both formal and informal, of refugee settlements. Payne 
(1998) looked at such limitations by studying the effects of food shortages in Ikafe Refugee 
Settlement in Arua. The research found that food shortages led to harvesting in unsafe conditions, 
sexual exchanges as survival strategies, fewer small-scale businesses, cash shortages, and market 
collapses. Her work was rooted mostly in gender relations, which is not what my research will be 
looking at specifically, however, she sets a precedent for the link that exists between aid and 
socioeconomic structures.  
Oka (2011) takes on a new approach by exploring the possibility of the informal economy 
as a causal agent for permanent urban sustainability in Kakuma Refugee Camp in Kenya. He 
begins by explaining how settlements are not deemed to need or possess any form of commercial 
activity. Informal economies in camps are discouraged by local and regional relief workers as they 
might be trying to protect refugees from the effects of commercial economies, oligopolies… (Oka, 
2011). The problem that tends to arise is that formalized income generating activities do not suffice 
and, if anything, are lacking in presence. As a result, refugees tend to engage in activities that are 
illegal such as smuggling or prostitution (Jacobsen, 2002). Oka argues that these informal 
economies are essential because they “provide goods and services not supplied within the relief 
packages” (Oka, 2011, p. 225). When refugees can engage in any kind of economic activity, it 
helps them develop a sense of “normality” in a supposedly transient period of their life. The 
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informal economy offers access to goods and services that are not deemed as necessities by NGOs 
but that still enhance someone’s life; electronics, information technology, imported beers and 
spirits, clothing, sporting equipment, restaurants… (Oka, 2011). In protracted situations, living off 
aid can become exhausting and lead to feelings of self-deprecation, low self-worth, and 
powerlessness (Meyer et al., 2019). Oka identified that the cash and credit that flows into Kakuma 
derives from employment opportunities within humanitarian projects (more likely) or the 
commercial sector (less likely), remittances and money transfers from relatives, or sales of relief 
goods into the black market. Alloush et al. (2017) found that NGOs in Congolese camps in Rwanda 
employ a large share of refugees, 21-44% depending on the camp. The camp economy employs 
more than two-thirds of refugee wage workers in one of the Rwandan camps (Alloush et al., 2017). 
This creates disposable income that allows refugees to regain some control of their life. Even then, 
WFP aid still represents 76-78% of refugee household total income. Alloush et al. (2017) also 
found that 80% of Congolese refugees sold about 80% of their package. When refugees sold the 
WFP food basket, they only receive 64% of what it is actually worth. Alloush et al. (2017) argue 
in support of cash-assistance as welfare indicators suggest that refugees in CBI camps are better 
off than those receiving in-kind food. Cash allows for economic activity which eventually could 
fuel a larger informal economy.  
There is a tendency to view refugees as passive victims who wait for relief handouts from 
humanitarian organizations. This ignores the fact that prior to displacement refugees had lives and 
fails to acknowledge the multiple and diverse ways refugees can pursue livelihoods for themselves. 
To ignore the fundamental benefits that refugee economies can generate is to undermine the 
potential for self-sufficiency in refugee settlements. These studies really focus on the link between 
food assistance and economic structures, which will be further explored in this study. 
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Chapter 3: Methodology 
General Overview 
This study took place in Adjumani District during a four-week research period in 
April/May 2019. Adjumani was purposefully selected because it lies in the West-Nile sub-region 
of Uganda with a proportionally high level of food insecurity, as reported by the IPC. It is also one 
of the regions with the most refugees in Uganda and a region that is continuing to receive new 
entries. The fieldwork took place over two weeks. The researcher was working with an 
implementing partner of the UNHCR. The partner facilitated transportation to the field and 
coordinated translators. Data was collected primarily in Mireyi Refugee Settlement, Boroli 
Refugee Settlement, and Mungula I Refugee Settlement, Adjumani town, and Pakelle town. The 
study consisted of eight key informant interviews; 17 in-depth interviews with refugees; informal 
conversations in the field with various implementing partners; participant observation of food 
distribution and cash distribution, team meetings, two focus groups; and morning team meetings.  
From the very first interview with a refugee I noted that not all information matched with what 
organizations had told me or what I was seeing on the ground. Thus, throughout the process I did 
a lot of cross-checking to try and ascertain the most accurate account of the facts presented.  
Reflexivity Statement 
The researcher’s positionality as a young, white woman, coming from a university in the 
USA may have influenced the information that was being presented, especially from refugees. 
Because the researcher’s appearance resembled that of funders and M&E professionals, refugees 
easily misconstrued the intention behind the study and were hesitant to trust the researcher. The 
researcher explained who she was and what she was doing from the very beginning to reduce 
future discomfort that may have arisen by assuming she was going to compensate them later on or 
produce great changes in the refugee settlements. The values of the societies I have been raised in 
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(Spain, the Netherlands, and the United States) may also affect how I interpret information. To 
counter this, I used an objective questionnaire for assessing food security. I also interviewed 
different key informants to cross-check information being provided by refugees and information 
about Adjumani more broadly. I employed method triangulation by comparing data collected 
through different methods (focus group, interviews, observation…). Method triangulation ensures 
that results are not simply due to the choice of methods and can increase confidence that research 
findings actually represent the meanings presented by the participants. This was all to make the 
findings more credible and valid.  
Sample Selection 
For interviews with formal institutional bodies I used purposive sampling and snowball 
sampling. I began by meeting with the regional director of AFOD who offered me an internship at 
the organization to facilitate my research process. The director recommended I speak to officials 
from Food for the Hungry and the Danish Refugee Council. This was useful as I became familiar 
with the different organizations operating on the ground. I was also fortunate to meet the district 
planner while at dinner one night and was able to interview him (Appendix 1). 
For interviews with refugees I used a mix of stratified, convenience, and snowball samplings. I 
was constrained to the refugee settlements that AFOD worked, so I was only able to hear the 
experiences of refugees in Mireyi, Boroli, and Mungula I. I wanted to ensure my sample was 
representational of the population but knew I would not have a way of accessing data on all 
refugees and selecting randomly, which is why I had to incorporate aspects of convenience and 
snowball sampling. The translators were the ones that identified the refugees I would be speaking 
to, based on who they knew and who was home. However, I requested to speak to males and 
females of different age ranges and the translators accommodated my appeal as much as possible. 
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The target was to speak to two men and two women for each age group category. The age group 
categories were 16-25, 26-40, 40+. The researcher spoke with two females and three males 
between 16-25, seven females and two males between 26-40, and 3 males aged above 40. In total 
the researcher spoke with 9 females and 8 males. The only minors that were interviewed were 
emancipated minors as the researcher wanted to ensure their experiences were also considered in 
this study (Appendix 2). 
The first focus group was spontaneous. It began as an interview with a refugee participant, 
but a couple other people joined in at the end and so the researcher decided to use the opportunity 
to organize a focus group and discuss shared experiences of food security and livelihood 
opportunities at the settlement. The second focus group was organized by an implementing partner 
and the researcher was invited to listen in (Appendix 3). The topics covered overlapped greatly 
with this research as they were also studying food security, general security, and livelihoods).    
Data Collection 
Interviews 
Qualitative interviews were the primary source of data collection for this study. In total 23 
formal interviews were conducted with refugees, government officials, and different UN partners. 
Interviews with key informants took place in offices, the SIT building, or over the phone. These 
offered qualitative in-depth responses as the interviewees were very informed about the activities 
in the community and in the settlement. The goal of these interviews was to collect information 
from a wide range of people, involved in different organizations, and working on different projects. 
Interviews with refugees were more informal. They took place in the settlement, in a private area 
near the home of the interviewee. Interviews with refugees were conducted either in English or in 
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various local languages from South Sudan, which were interpreted by a translator. These 
interviews all ranged between 30 minutes to one hour.  
For both types of interviews, a semi-structured interview guide was used (Appendix 4 and 
Appendix 5). It included different themes to explore in the form of key questions to ensure 
standardization of interviews. However, using a semi-structured interview guide allowed more 
flexibility in terms of order, wording, and depth of questions. The interviewee was also able to 
explore different points and more freely change direction. Semi-structured interviews were better 
for acquiring information on socially sensitive issues because the researcher was able to ask the 
interviewee to elaborate on their answers. It had both the flexibility of open-ended approaches but 
advantages of structural approaches. A mix of descriptive questions, structural questions, and 
evaluative questions were used.  
Throughout my time in Adjumani the researcher also had more informal conversations with 
different aid workers, refugees, and locals that helped inform my study. Even though there was no 
formal structure, any information that was discussed that the researcher deemed relevant or 
important was noted down. If the material discussed was sensitive, consent was first asked for.    
HFIAS Questionnaire 
The HFIAS questionnaire (see chapter 2) was also incorporated into interviews with 
refugees. The questionnaire was modified by eliminating question 4. All 9 questions were asked 
in the first interview and the researcher found that the interviewee was confused with question four 
because it seemed to ask the same thing as questions two and three. Translation could have been 
the cause and the researcher decided that for clarity question 4 would be eliminated from the 
questionnaire for future interviews. All questions were asked in relation to what had occurred in 
the past month. Responses were coded as follows: rarely (=1-5 times in the last month, sometimes 
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(=6-14 times in the last month), and often (=more than two weeks in the last month). The 
questionnaire was administered orally.  
Participant Observation 
The researcher was able to participate in cash and food distribution. Through this 
experience the researcher was able to learn about the daily proceedings and day to day operations, 
observe the numbers of refugees that came, listen to conversations, identify the different foods 
being delivered and their quantities, learn about recurring challenges… While walking through the 
settlement the researcher was able to observe what was going on around me, the quality of the 
land, the weather and climate in the area, daily activities… The researcher was also able to observe 
the markets that are right outside of the food distribution point and see the relationship between 
aid and commercial activities in the settlement.  
Everything that was observed and while on the field was written down in either a notebook 
or a phone. The researcher tried to take photographs where possible but did not want to overstep 
boundaries so was quite cautious. Throughout the process the researcher was continuously 
reflecting and leaving decision trails to ensure that she would later be able to provide justification 
for all my decisions and critically consider how my position is affecting participants. The 
observations in Adjumani took the form of direct observation since behavior was being recorded 
as it occurred. It was also an undisguised observation as respondents were aware of the fact that 
the researcher was an outsider looking in.  
Focus Groups 
Focus group were conducted with refugees to explore the group’s understanding of food 
security and their perceptions of their daily life and activities. As aforementioned, the first focus 
group was arranged impromptu, so the questions discussed stemmed from the interview guide and 
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from points that refugees had previously raised. The conversation focused on challenges facing 
the youth specifically. The second focus group was organized by an implementing partner, but the 
topics were related to the objectives of this research. Focus groups were a convenient way of 
collecting data from several individuals simultaneously. They were useful for exploring people’s 
knowledge and experiences by allowing insight into what interviewees think, how they think, and 
why they think that way. By letting participants interact with one another the researcher was able 
to read between the lines and understand the more “private” stories that sometimes participants 
hide from researchers. The first focus group was conducted in English. The second focus group 
was in English and two other languages, so there was a translator assisting.  
Morning Briefings 
In the morning, prior to daily operations, the team on the ground received a briefing from 
the team leader. These briefings covered topics related to the nature of the individuals in the 
settlement and the settlement itself, challenges to expect, general information, and logistics. The 
briefings allowed the researcher to gain experience of what happens “behind the scenes” and 
provided me with background information on the settlement that is not always easily accessible. 
The researcher was also able to ask questions during the meetings; and was able to meet members 
of the team who also offered useful information. 
Secondary Sources 
A number of reports found online as well as reports provided by different individuals were 
used for this study. Previous research was guided some of the policy solutions in the coming 
chapters and to fill in missing information gaps. NGOs also provided unpublished reports, 
brochures, and documents to supplement this research.  
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Data Analysis 
To analyze my interviews, an inductive content analysis was used to reduce recorded 
material into more manageable, hierarchically structured data from which the researcher was able 
to identify patterns and gain insight. Emergent themes were identified and then turned into clusters 
and hierarchies before producing higher order themes and subordinate themes.  
Households were also categorized based on their responses to the HFIAS questionnaire. 
While looking at occurrence questions, ‘no’ was coded as 0, and the frequency-of-occurrence was 
also valued to be 0. If respondents replied with a yes, the frequency-of-occurrence questions were 
coded. ‘Rarely’ was coded as a 1, ‘sometimes’ was coded as a 2, and ‘often’ was coded as a 3. To 
obtain the HFIAS score, the codes for frequency-of-occurrence questions for each household were 
added together. The maximum score possible was 24 as there were eight questions.  Food secure 
households would range with a score between 0-8, food insecure houses between 9-16, and 
extremely food insecure 17-24.  
The researcher broke down the nutrients of the food aid package by using Cronometer, a 
web app for counting calories and tracking diet. While the results will not be 100% accurate, it 
will provide a basis that can be used for future research.   
Research Ethics 
Ethics are particularly important to this research topic since the researcher was working 
with vulnerable populations. This was a minimal risk study as participants were not experiencing 
anything that they don’t usually undergo in routine physical or psychological tests. The researcher 
did not ask them to discuss any sensitive or triggering topics relating to experiences from South 
Sudan.  
The first step in the process, was acquiring informed consent from interviewees (Appendix 
6). Participants were orally asked for consent after the researcher explained who she was, what her 
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purpose was, how the data would be used, benefits, and what the research required of participants. 
Participants were made aware that their participation was voluntary and that they had a right to 
withdraw at any point. The only people interviewed between 16-18 were emancipated minors. The 
researcher believed their perspective would be significant and might differ from the rest of the 
sample and wanted to include them in my study. Participants were also guaranteed that their data 
and personal information would remain anonymous and confidential. In informal interviews 
participants were asked if it was okay for the researcher to use information that could make them 
uncomfortable if made public. Before photographing or video recording anyone the researcher 
would also ask for consent. Moreover, the translators were briefed about the ethical guidelines 
they had to follow and how they had to keep all that they heard confidential as well.  
There was a general pushback from some refugees who had experience interacting with 
other white people. Prior research has made refugees hesitant to trust the intentions of foreigners 
in the settlement as many of them mislead them into what they are actually doing. In attempts to 
avoid such discomfort the researcher answered any questions they had about herself and my study, 
made clear that she was not profiting financially from this research and took the e-mails of 
individuals who wanted to receive a final copy of the study. To build rapport prior to the interview 
the researcher greeted refugees in Arabic or Dinka, to the best of her abilities and to make them 
feel a bit more at ease with her presence.  The researcher tried to establish rapport with the 
informant in a manner that would make the feel comfortable and safe but not in a manipulative 
way that would result in participants regretting sharing information.  
Secondly, more specifically in the settlement and host community, the researcher ensured 
that participants physical and mental harm was protected. All interviews were conducted in a quiet 
and secluded location where no one could overhear the answers. Because this study focuses on 
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food security, the topics that were raised in interviews and focus groups would hopefully not be 
too emotionally intense. The researcher avoided discussing personal topics unless they were raised 
by refugees. Even then, the researcher tried to be supportive while reminding them that she was 
only a student with limited ability to truly help them as they requested. 
The researcher also ensured that the participants identity remained anonymous and their 
data confidential by not writing identifying markers on my transcribed data. In the raw notes the 
names of refugees were jotted down in order to remember them if future conversation arose and 
to help build stronger rapport. However, raw interview notes will be destroyed once this study is 
concluded.   
Method Strengths and Limitations 
Using different research techniques allowed for method triangulation. Being able to work 
with an implementing organization and to be present in the field ensured that the findings were 
also representative of the reality happening on the ground. It allowed the researcher to develop an 
understanding of the real situation that would not have been possible if this research had taken 
place from afar. Being embedded with an implementing partner granted the researcher some 
credibility and made some refugees more comfortable when speaking with her. The translators 
also began trusting the researcher more after they saw that she was involved with programs on the 
ground.  
There are also limitations that must also be considered. The researcher had limited time to 
conduct her research and write the final report. This meant that she was not able to spend as long 
as she would have liked on the field conducting ground research. It also minimized the sample 
size. Ideally, there would have been enough time to speak with local farmers to learn about their 
involvement with supplying food for the settlement, but the research period did not allow for that. 
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The researcher worried that more interviews would render this research to broad in scope and 
reduce the value of the study. Due to the Easter holidays, the available time to spend in the field 
was also reduced. Secondly, there were translation issues that could have affected the information 
received from refugees. It is hard to know if all that they explained in their local language was well 
interpreted when translated to me and what kind of information was lost or misinterpreted. Thirdly, 
the HFIAS questionnaire may not have been the most appropriate tool for measuring household 
food insecurity as there was a high level of household food insecurity to begin with. This meant 
that all households ranked quite high, making it hard to differentiate more nuanced factors leading 
to higher levels of household food insecurity. The HFIAS variable score means more when it is 
looked at in relation to other scores of similar areas, but there was very little room for proper 
comparative analysis given the circumstances of food security faced in Boroli and Mireyi.  Finally, 
this study cannot be generalized to all refugees and all settlements in Adjumani due to the small 
sample size. However, it does depict a reality that cannot be ignored and should be used as a 
preliminary study to guide future research in the area. 
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Findings 
Chapters 4-7 will outline the logistical aspects of operations in the settlement, map out the 
food aid process (from procurement to consumption), describe the state of food security, and 
explore the link between food aid, food security, and socioeconomic structures in the settlement. 
This paper will argue that (1) refugees and NGOs have contrasting views on the actual function of 
food aid, creating a state of uncertainty and frustration in the settlements and (2) food aid must be 
redefined in a manner that acknowledges its value as an economic asset with the potential to 
enhance livelihoods.  
Chapter 8 will identify possible solutions moving forward and further areas of research.   
 
Chapter 4: The Settlements 
Adjumani is one of the four refugee-receiving districts in Northern Uganda, currently 
housing a refugee population of 233,654 (District planner, personal communication, April 30, 
2019). These refugees live amongst the 18 settlements found in the district, all established in 
different years, and include: Ayilo 1 and 2 established in 2015, Mungula 1 & 2 (1996), Alere 1 & 
2 (1990), Olua 1 & 2 (2012), Pagirinya (2016), Baratuku (1991), Baroli (2014), Nyumanzi (2014), 
Maaji 1, 2 & 3 (1997), Ayilo (2015), Mireyi (1994), Oliji (1991) and Elema (1992) (UNDP, 2018). 
These differ in population, land quality, and land size. All of the refugees in Adjumani are from 
South Sudan, with the majority being women and children (personal communication, April 24, 
2019). The refugees are from very many different tribes, some being Dinka, Nueur, Kuku, Madi, 
Latuho…  
Operations 
Refugee issues in Uganda are handled via a specified coordination framework that includes 
multiple key stakeholders. At a national level, the Office of the Prime Minister works alongside 
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the UNHCR. Together, they are responsible for ensuring general well-being of refugees, with the 
OPM focusing more on land and security and the UNHCR on services and resettlement (OPM 
Official, personal communication, April 12, 2019). The Minister of Refugees is assisted by a 
technical team on the ground that handles the day-to-day needs of different settlements. Private 
companies and donors play a backseat role that must also be mentioned (OPM Official, personal 
communication, April 12, 2019).  
At a district level there are various initiatives geared towards refugees and the host 
community. The district itself plans for projects targeted towards improving health, education, 
water, roads... Such services do not segregate refugees from non-refugees and are intentioned for 
all people living in the district (District planner, personal communication, April 30, 2019). Funding 
for these projects comes from the central government. The district then plans based on needs and 
apportion their needs to fit into the available resources. As a result, there are many underfunded 
priorities that must be constantly marginalized to make space for other projects (District planner, 
personal communication, April 30, 2019). The problem that arises when it comes to funding is 
related to challenges with the recency of census data. The GoU carries out a census survey every 
10 years. The last time one was conducted in Adjumani was in 2014, and at the time there were 
only 50,000 refugees in the district. Thus, the allocation of government funds does not calculate 
the dramatic increase in refugees that has taken place over the past five years (District planner, 
personal communication, April 30, 2019). At a government level there is also a refugee desk officer 
who oversees the management of the settlements in the district. There are different settlement 
commandants who are responsible for coordinating operations on the field. These are further 
supported bottoms-up by Refugee Welfare Councils. RWCs constitute of refugees themselves to 
ensure that they also have a say in the management of their settlement. 
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On the ground, NGOs serve as implementing and operating partners for the different UN 
bodies. Implementing partners receive funding from the UNHCR (OPM Official, personal 
communication, April 12, 2019). Operating partners do not receive funding from the UNHCR but 
still play a large role in the settlements. Some of the most prominent partners on the field in 
Adjumani are AFOD, LWF, DRC, Food for the Hungry, MTI, the Red Cross, PostBank, TPO, 
Windle Trust (personal communication, April 16, 2019). These organizations are implementing 
programs relating to issues of food assistance, protection, livelihood, education, health, WASH, 
psychosocial support… (OPM Official, personal communication, April 12, 2019). NGOs are 
required to provide 70% of their services to refugees and 30% of their services to the host 
community.  
The GoU is currently considering placing responsibility on the district to report what the 
NGOs are doing so that they government can have access to the details of their operations and of 
their spending (District planner, personal communication, April 30, 2019). Yet, most of these 
NGOs do not declare their resource envelope. This poses a transparency problem that makes it 
challenging to know to what exactly 70% and 30% looks like (District planner, personal 
communication, April 30, 2019). No NGO has come on board yet to declare their involvement in 
the district. According to the district planner it appears that NGOs are operating at their own level, 
they are “left free because they are not mandated to work through the district, though ideally that 
is what they should be doing” (personal communication, April 30, 2019). There is a minimal level 
of coordination between the UNHCR, OPM, the district, and NGOs creating very limited space 
for an effective middle ground (District planner, personal communication, April 30, 2019).  
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Chapter 5: Food Relief 
Procurement 
The World Food Programme 
The primary operating actor in providing food aid and enhancing food security around the 
world is the United Nations World Food Programme. They work via implementing partners who 
carry out most of their operations on the ground. The main donors for the WFP in Uganda are 
Belgium, Canada, China, Denmark, European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations 
(ECHO), Iceland, Ireland, Japan, Republic of Korea, Luxembourg, Norway, Switzerland, Uganda, 
UN CERF, UK, USA and multilateral and private donors. However, the WFP continues to struggle 
to meet its funding needs. The WFP has listed six strategic outcomes in their Uganda Strategic 
Plan from 2018-2022 (WFP, 2017): 
1- Refugees and other crisis affected people in Uganda access adequate and nutritious food 
in times of crisis 
2- Food insecure populations in areas affected by climate shocks have access to adequate 
and nutritious food all year 
3- Children aged 6-59 months in food insecure areas have acute malnutrition rates in line 
with national targets by 2030 
4- Smallholder farmers, especially women, in targeted areas have enhanced and resilient 
livelihoods by 2030 
5- Institutions have increased capacity to coordinate and manage food security and nutrition 
programmes and respond to shocks by 2030 
6- Humanitarian actors have access to cost efficient supply chain services when needed 
HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE IN PROTRACTED EMERGENCIES 52 
The experience and expertise of the WFP are also valuable to governments who can then use the 
knowledge for their own supply chains and safety net programs that serve more food insecure 
people in their own countries (WFP, 2006).  
Local Procurement 
The WFP’s policy is to “procure food in a manner that is cost-effective, timely and 
appropriate to beneficiary needs, encouraging procurement from developing countries to the 
widest extent possible” (WFP, 2006).  One of their main priorities is to avoid causing negative 
effects on markets, which would consequently harm the food security of the poor. The WFP buys 
79% of the food it uses from Low Income Countries or Middle-Income Countries and sources 
more than 60% of its food, goods, and services in locations where it operates. Even “in the depth 
of crisis [they] turn to local suppliers” to energize local economies. Most of the World Food 
Programme’s local procurement comes from farmers’ associations, which have to follow the 
subsequent criteria: minimum membership of women of 40%, geographic location, already 
supported by a partner, and the capacity to sell. (Bronkhorst, 2011). These associations are trained 
by the WFP in storage, quality control, and marketing. Local purchases by the WFP between 2001 
and 2004 in Burkina Faso were very positive (Bronkhorst, 2011). The WFP locally purchased over 
US$9 million, which became money that was injected into the country in cash. Had that food been 
provided in kind, the country would have received only $6,927,193. However, it is important to 
acknowledge that there is the possibility that the capital injection does not properly reach all 
members of society equally (Bronkhosrt, 2011). 
Purchase for Progress (P4P) 
The WFP has also created and piloted the Purchase for Progress (P4P) programme in 20 
countries. The aim is to empower and encourage low-income small-holder farmers to increase their 
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production by linking them to buyers who can offer more competitive prices (Kizito and Kato, 
2018). The WFP has pledged to “source 10% of its food purchases from smallholder farmers and 
encourages national governments and the private sector to buy food in ways that benefit 
smallholders” (WFP, 2014 and WFP, 2015). A large component of the project in Uganda is the 
construction of satellite collection points, a sort of warehouse, with a capacity between 100 and 
300 metric tons (Kizito and Kato, 2018). Individual farmers deliver their produce to these SCPs 
where they are first checked for quality and then stored. They are told to wait for prices to increase 
as the store management committee searchers for buyers in offices, schools, radios, NGOs… When 
they obtain a good price, farmers are consulted for approval on the price and consent to sell. The 
money is received by the treasurer of the management committee who deducts storage costs and 
then distributes the money to farmers (Kizito and Kato, 2018). The results of a study by Kizito and 
Kato (2018) indicate that “farmers who stored maize at SCPs sold significantly more at higher 
prices, stored a greater quantity, incurred higher storage cots, and earned more crop income than 
those who did not” (p. 173). Those that used the warehouses earned UGX 371,179. Other important 
findings were that farmers who stored tended were more likely to be either females, older-aged, 
from rural areas, without formal education, and members of a credit or savings group (Kizito and 
Kato, 2018). Bronkhorst (2011) explains that it is beneficial use an intermediary in local 
procurement as they can diminish transaction costs and therefore be welfare increasing. However, 
he also indicated that these positive effects are diminished if the producer is not paid efficiently. 
The largest of such warehouses in Uganda is in Tororo (personal communication, April 19, 2019). 
The district planner reported knowing about one warehouse in Adjumani, located in Ofoa sub-
county (personal communication, April 30, 2019).  
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The Reality 
A former World Vision Procurement Officer explained that procurement is more political 
and economically-motivated than it might appear on paper. While the WFP does procure locally, 
some of the companies they are procuring from are actually owned by individuals working in the 
WFP itself. Thus, it is a way of making money for themselves rather than a means to benefit the 
country as a whole. Information on this claim is limited and requires significant more research for 
it to be truly verified. 
When observing the food being distributed in Adjumani it all was procured locally, coming 
from Uganda, Tanzania, or Zambia. However, the procurement was from large, well-established 
companies. For example, beans were procured from Aponye Uganda Limited, which is a well-
known cereals & pulses bulker, processor, and exporter. The conditions to become a company that 
the WFP can procure from are very stringent and hard to reach for the average Ugandan farmer or 
Ugandan farming group.  
The P4P programme also seems to be very limited in scope as of right now. When 
discussing the feasibility of the P4P program being more responsible for food supply in the 
settlement, the district planner appeared discouraged. The quality and the quantity of food that the 
WFP desires cannot be met by local people. Local people are quickly knocked off and replaced by 
the large companies that have the necessary capacities (district planner, personal communication, 
April 30, 2019). Evidence from eastern and southern Africa seems to indicate that “most 
smallholder farmers do not participate as sellers in staple food grains markets, at least not at any 
significant scale” (Barrett, 2008, p. 313). The two basic barriers to entry into such markets are 
insufficient private access to productive assets and technologies that generate marketable surplus 
(Barrett, 2008). The second is the high cost of commerce in remote areas (Barrett, 2008). With 
limited bulking capabilities that are required and the lack of organization that exists at a district 
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level P4P seems impossible. It only works when there is a cooperative arrangement, but 
arrangement is also missing in the district. That kind of arrangement costs an initial sum of money 
that smallholder farmers might not be willing to set aside while still struggling to meet their daily 
needs.  
Thus, despite the different efforts that exist in regard to WFP procurement policies, the 
reality is not as straightforward as assumed by the policy framework the organization sets forth. 
On paper, local procurement sounds good, but when one breaks down who constitutes that “local”, 
a grim picture is painted. “Local” still continues to be, for the most part, the elites of the country. 
While it is still better than international procurement, as money is being injected into the economy, 
there is no guarantee that that money is properly distributed. Furthermore, there is still limited 
evidence supporting the supposed ideal of “trickle down” benefits.  
 
Distribution 
AFOD 
AFOD is the main implementing partner of the WFP in Adjumani and is primarily 
responsible for food distribution. Their vision is “to work with rural poor, marginalized and 
vulnerable communities to improve their social economic status and quality of life” (AFOD 
Website). AFOD has now been working for three years in Adjumani. They first began working 
with three settlements and five sub-counties and have now evolved to work in 18 settlements and 
12 sub-counties. Their main program is food and cash distribution, funded by the WFP. However, 
the organization also works on HIV linkage and referral, funded by the infectious disease institute; 
as well as adolescent sexual and reproductive health, funded by the USA. The team consists of 60 
permanent staff members and 1260 non-permanent staff members, mostly refugees who help with 
unloading and food distribution (personal communication, April 26, 2019).  They also distribute 
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non-food items (soap, cooking materials…), but due to budget restrictions, this only occurs every 
two years.  
The Process 
On the day of distribution refugees begin lining up very early in the morning at the food 
distribution point. Before distribution begins refugees are given a short talk on how they will get 
food, how much food they will get, advice on how to use the ration, and health and nutrition 
education. This should be happening on a monthly basis but refugees in the focus group explained 
that the occurrence of such talks were random.  
Refugees must first go through a verification process where individuals from the WFP scan 
them into the system. Persons with special needs are given priority and are served first.  Last year 
the UNHCR switched to biometric registration so refugees are now able to use their thumbprint to 
get verified. The household head is the person responsible for picking up the cash or the food. If 
they are not present, no other family member is permitted as a substitute.  Individuals who do not 
pass the verification stage, which can occur for reasons such as having a new member in the family 
or the household head passing away, go to a desk set up by the UNHCR to solve the issues. 
 Once refugees are verified, they are able to line up for either cash or food (based on what they are 
registered for). If refugees want to switch from one to the other, they must undergo a family 
meeting and then register with the WFP. However, switching is not often encouraged, and most 
families don’t switch more than one time. Making a shift from cash to food aid is recommended 
for persons with special needs, as they might struggle with having to move around and buy food 
for themselves.  
Cash is distributed by PostBank, a non-bank credit institution in Uganda supervised by the 
Bank of Uganda. Right before receiving cash, individuals are checked again to ensure they have 
been verified and so a record can be made that they have received the cash. If an individual skips 
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the verification process they must go back to the beginning. Cash is handed out of a PostBank van 
and the process can take anywhere between one to two days, depending on the population of the 
settlement.  
Food is distributed by AFOD with the help of the WFP and refugees. Once refugees have 
undergone verification, they enter what is referred to as a corridor. There is a salt station, followed 
by an oil station, a bean station, and a maize station. At every station, refugees provide a bag or 
jerrycans and scoopers (refugee volunteers) use a rough measuring tool to deliver food according 
to household size. At the very end, all food is measured using an electronic scale and measurements 
are adjusted to ensure they are exactly what is required. Household size is proven by refugee 
identity cards. Individuals are scanned in right before having their food weighed to ensure that 
they have been verified. Similar to the cash process, if the individual has not been verified, they 
must go back to the initial line. The food distribution process also takes about one or two days, 
and overall moves slower than cash distribution. 
Cash-Based Interventions 
Cash-based interventions were introduced by the UNHCR in hopes of increasing protection 
of refugees by reducing the risk of resorting to harmful coping mechanisms for survival. “where 
feasible, [cash-based interventions] are often a more dignified way of assisting affected 
populations, as they empower people to determine their own needs and the best way of meeting 
them. They can also promote peaceful co-existence with host communities, as well-designed and 
run cash-based interventions have a multiplier effect, directly benefiting the local economy” 
(UNCHR, 2012, p. 5). They have been used since the 1990s, but in 2011 is when a real increase 
occurred (UNHCR, 2012).  
The main reasons refugees in Adjumani chose cash assistance rather than food assistance 
was because they were able to buy a wider range of foods, budget their own money, buy non-food 
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items, pay for school fees, and have money for health emergencies. They also explained that the 
food package was not enough, but that the cash assistance is not much better (personal 
communications, April 18, 23, 24, 2019). 
In Adjumani refugees are given 31,000 UGX per person per month and told to spend 1,000 
UGX a day. This is the equivalent of $8.22 USD per month, $0.265 USD per day (as of May 6, 
2019). This illustrates an intrinsic irony in humanitarian assistance and human rights, similarly to 
what is discussed by Oliver and Ilcan (2018). The same institution that is fighting to combat 
poverty and ensure that “nobody gets left behind” via the Sustainable Development Goals tries to 
rationalize with refugees that 31,000 UGX per month is an acceptable amount for life. These 
refugees are surviving with less than $1.25 per day, which is considered to be the lower limit for 
living in extreme poverty. Furthermore, refugees are told by aid workers that the money cannot be 
spent on items other than food (personal communication, April 24, 2019), even though the whole 
purpose of creating CBI was to grant refugees more autonomy and allow them to feel as if they 
were living a more “normal” life (UNHCR, 2012). Refugees used to receive 45,000 per month, 
which they themselves explained created a much better living situation. However, with funding 
cuts, the ration reduced, and consequently so did the scope of its purpose. When asked about 
medical services and school services in the settlements, refugees reported that there were free 
clinics but, in some settlements, these are too far away in cases of emergencies. Furthermore, good 
schools often are expensive and free schools provided by different NGOs and the GoU in the 
district often tell refugees that they are out of space (personal communication, April 24, 2019). 
Even when school is free, refugees must incur the costs of uniforms, books… There is only free 
universal primary education, refugees, like locals, must pay for nursery school, secondary school, 
and university.  
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In-Kind Food Aid 
The second type of food assistance is in-kind food aid. The main reasons refugees in Boroli 
and Mireyi chose food assistance was because cash reductions did not allow for food to be bought 
for the entire family (personal communication, April 18, 24, 2019). Only two out of seventeen 
refugees interviewed relied on food aid. In Boroli settlement 1,800 refugees rely on cash and 847 
rely on food (personal communication, April 23, 2019). Refugees are told not to sell their food 
rations. However, on the day of food distribution there were a number of refugees outside of the 
food distribution point selling their food. Furthermore, most of the refugees that used cash reported 
using it to buy products from refugees selling off their rations.   
Recipients are given a food basket that consists of 12.6 kilograms of dry white maize, 2.4 
kilograms of mixed beans, 1.5 kilograms of corn-soya blend, 0.9 kilograms of vegetable oil 
fortified with vitamin A and D, and 0.15 kilograms of salt per person per month. This month, due 
to food poisoning that happened with CSB in Karamoja, the rations did not include CSB and 
substituted it by adding 0.6 kilograms of beans per person. Per day, individuals would eat roughly 
406 grams of dry white maize (=1567kcal), 96/77 (this month/usually) grams of beans 
(=341/273kcal), 48 grams of CSB (=182kcal), 29 grams of oil (=256kcal), and 4 grams of salt 
(=0kcal). This comes out to be 2280 kcal when CSB is present (Figure 1) or 2165 kcal when CSB 
is not present (Figure 2). These numbers are all estimates as exact nutritional data for WFP food 
could not be obtained, with the exception of nutritional information for CSB. While macronutrient 
calorie goals are reached, the diet is deficient in omega-3, vitamin B5, vitamin B12, vitamin C, 
vitamin E, vitamin K, calcium, potassium, iodine, and selenium. It is possible that salt is fortified 
with iodine, as that is a common norm around the world. Other foods might also be fortified but 
no information on that could be found. Most of the fat in the diet comes from oil, which is not the 
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healthiest in the long-term. Furthermore, it is important to acknowledge that this is if refugees 
don’t sell any of their food, however, that does not often seem to be the case as they need disposable 
income for other necessities.    
Challenges 
There are five main challenges when it comes to food distribution. The first is the fact that 
the household head must be present for collection. When the household head is sick, or if the 
household head works in a different city, they must still be present so that their family can eat. 
Refugees reported that often times they are not informed until the day before that food distribution 
will be taking place and some individuals miss it. While AFOD explained that there is a schedule 
hanging in every settlement (focus group), more must be done to ensure that this information is 
easily accessible and communicated earlier on (personal communication).  
The second challenge is for younger household heads who are still attending school. There 
was a case where three refugee boys were late to pick up cash because they had been at school all 
day and were told to come back tomorrow. However, they had an exam the following day that was 
not possible to miss and challenging to reschedule. One of the aid workers said, “tell them you are 
a refugee and you have to come to pick up your food” (thick description). Refugees did not choose 
to become refugees, they have already lost a lot, and more should be done to provide alternatives 
to minimize the chances of children having to jeopardize their education. Similar problems were 
also discussed in the second focus group.  
Thirdly, various refugees complained about the distance between their homes and the food 
distribution center (focus group 2). Refugees who live in Mungula II must travel about 5 kilometers 
each way, which costs about 6000 UGX total. This money is not covered for by the UN or the 
OPM and comes out of the refugee’s rations. Furthermore, refugees in Mungula explained that 
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there is no support for elderly people who then have to carry their food home. Other settlements, 
such as Palogrinya, receives that support, but it is lacking in Mungula.  
Fourth, refugees often find themselves waiting all day to receive food or cash. They are 
often disturbed by the heat and/or the rain. The process itself can only go so fast, however, when 
it came to cash distribution in Boroli, there was only one person giving out cash. A more efficient 
delivery system could be beneficial for the general wellbeing of refugees.  
Finally, it is really difficult for aid workers to ensure that refugees do not sell food rations or misuse 
their cash rations, which can lead to frustrations when refugees complain about not having enough 
food.  
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Chapter 6: Food Aid and Food Security 
Household Food Security 
The average household food insecurity score was an 18.2. This score falls within the 
extremely food insecure category. The lowest score was a 12, the highest was a 24. The mode was 
a 20. In Mireyi settlement the average was a 20,5. In Boroli settlement the average was a 17. 
Overall Mireyi was drier and less fertile than Boroli, which might explain the difference. These 
results cannot be generalized as they might representational of the entire population, but they do 
paint a grim picture of the reality that many refugees are facing. While individuals in the focus 
group in Mungula were not given the questionnaire, no conclusions can be reached about that 
settlement, however, general complaints about not having enough food and still feeling hungry at 
night were very prevalent.  
There seemed to be a relationship between levels of education and food security. Refugees 
who had completed the Uganda Senior 4, or the Sudanese equivalent, had lower household 
insecurity food scores. A direct causal link cannot be established, but education does have a role 
in food security. These individuals placed a greater emphasis on the importance of monthly food 
planning as a family as well as nutritional diversity.  
Q1: Did you worry that your household would not have enough food? 
All refugees replied to this question with often. From the moment refugees pick up cash or 
food aid they appeared to be stressed about how they would ration the food over the month. All 
refugees reported that the assistance ran out before the month finished. Individuals that used cash 
explained that some months the cash runs out on the first day as refugees buy everything, they 
need that day. A lot of time is spent planning a diet and focusing on trying to apportion the food 
in a way that would ensure its longest durability while still trying to minimize how hungry 
everyone felt (personal communications, April 18, 23, 24, 26, 2019).  
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Q2: Were you or any household member not able to eat the kinds of foods you preferred because 
of a lack of resources?  
The average response for this question was a 2.35. When asked what foods they would like 
to eat refugees reported rice, chicken, beef, fish, eggs, and milk (personal communication, April 
23, 24, 2019). Some refugees also expressed a desire to be able to cook in the same manner as they 
did back home (personal communications, April 18, 23, 24, 2019). 
Q3: Did you or any household member have to eat a limited variety of foods due to a lack of 
resources?  
The average response for this question was a 2.29. The two refugees who relied on cash 
had strong opinions on this, as their meals lacked diverse foods. Overall refugees reported eating 
porridge and beans. Those who would eat meat would eat it on very rare occasions as it was more 
expensive and considered a luxury food (personal communication, April 24, 2019). However, the 
implications of this question are very important. Lack of a diverse diet can lead to micronutrient 
deficiencies, especially over time. Most important vitamins and minerals are obtained, however, 
vitamin B12, vitamin C, and calcium all appeared to be low. MTI is the organization responsible 
for nutrition, but when asked, refugees did not report any kind of vitamin and mineral 
supplementary vaccines being administered (personal communications, April 18, 23, 24, 26, 
2019). More research on this is needed.  
Q4: Did you or any household member have to eat a smaller meal than you felt you needed 
because there was not enough food? 
The average score for this question was a 2.82. Refugees explained that they usually had 
tea for breakfast and then either beans, maize, or porridge for their second meal (personal 
communications, April 18, 23, 24, 26, 2019). While refugees might be meeting all their caloric 
needs, about 250 calories come from oil, which is not a filling food.  
HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE IN PROTRACTED EMERGENCIES 64 
Q5: Did you or any household member have to eat fewer meals in a day because there was not 
enough food? 
The average score for this question was a 2.76. All but two refugees reported eating one or 
two meals a day. The most common schedule was having a small meal in the morning and then a 
larger meal at dinner time. The second most common schedule was having big meal in the middle 
of the afternoon (personal communications, April 18, 23, 24, 26, 2019). Refugees in Mireyi would 
eat a third meal of just mangos that they would get for free from trees in the settlement when 
possible (personal communications, April 18, 2019).  
Q6: Was there ever no food to eat of any kind in your household because of lack of resources 
to get food? 
The average score for this question was a 1.53. This was more common towards the end of 
the month, but they would often have something, even if it was some greens that they had 
cultivated in their own garden. If they completely ran out of food, they would borrow something 
from a neighbor or from a store (personal communications, April 24, 2019). 
Q7: Did you or any household member go to sleep at night hungry because there was not enough 
food? 
The average score for this question was a 2.17. Most refugees said they slept hungry every 
night, however, some said they were not able to sleep because of the headaches and stomach pains 
it caused them, and would always eat something, even if it was food coming from a neighbor’s 
house (personal communications, April 18, 23, 24, 26, 2019).  
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Q8: Did you or any household member go a whole day and night without eating anything 
because there was not enough food? 
The average score for this question was a 1.29. Only one refugee reported having gone 
over 24 hours without eating, most managed to eat something by the evening, even if it was a very 
small meal (personal communications, April 24, 2019).  
The Four Pillars of Food Security 
Based on the questionnaire, Boroli and Mireyi have low levels of food security. To better 
understand the results, it is important to break them down into the four pillars of food security. 
However, it is important to recognize that these findings do not apply to all settlements. Oliji is 
completely self-reliant and no longer dependent on food aid and cash. Mungula I and II as well as 
Maaji are slowly easing off of food aid. These would be valuable case studies in the future to see 
how the settlements are sustaining themselves presently.  
Availability 
The availability of food in the context of refugees is unique because food in the settlement 
is completely dependent on external funding. Supply is never a steady as it depends on a number 
of external factors. Funding has been a challenge as the refugee population continues to increase, 
already having increased more than 50% since 2014 (personal communication, April 18, 2019). 
The GoU focuses on the self-sufficiency model to try to increase the availability for refugees, in 
cases of food aid reductions. If refugees cultivate crops, they have more food available to them. 
The problem with that is that it is completely dependent on weather conditions, rain patters… 
which are also not fully in the control of refugees. Furthermore, the Dinkas and the Nuer are cattle-
keepers. For them, cultivating crops is somewhat taboo and thus, are disadvantaged when it comes 
to having to cultivate crops. The food provided by the WFP is not the food that they often are used 
to consuming to sustain themselves (personal communication, April 26, 2019 and May 7, 2019).  
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In terms of the food actually available, it is not enough to sustain an active and healthy life. 
This is seen while walking through the settlement as most refugees are stagnant and idle. Many of 
them also reported the lack of energy they had and the slow pace of their everyday life (personal 
communications, April 18, 23, 24, 2019).  
Access 
Food assistance is nondiscriminatory and so it is accessible to all refugees who are in need. 
However, just because there is food available in the settlement does not necessarily indicate that 
there is food security at a household level. Access refers more specifically to physical access, 
economic access, and social access. Physical access for refugees is often possible however, as 
aforementioned, some refugees have to travel very long distances to actually reach the food 
distribution point. Furthermore, if household heads are unable to make it on the day of distribution, 
physical access becomes impossible for the rest of the family. Most refugees indicate that everyone 
in the household eats equal amounts of food (personal communication, April 18, 23, 24, 2019). 
When asked if there had been cases where some family member takes all the food, refugees 
indicated that they had never heard of this happening, but they did not fully rule out the possibility 
(personal communication, April 18, 2019). Some household heads did indicate that they prioritize 
feeding children, which reduces equal social access opportunities to food (personal 
communications, April 24, 2019). In terms of economic access there is a clear challenge. Refugees 
receiving cash have minimal disposable income to actually spend on a wide variety of foods. 
Refugees receiving the food ration have no disposable income to buy any kind of food.  
Being provided with plots of lands increases refugees’ opportunities to have continuous 
access to food, regardless of income. However, if there is no money to buy seeds or animals, then 
this whole idea of self-sufficiency falls flat.  
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Utilization 
On the day of distribution, refugees are offered information sessions that are meant to 
provide them with information about the proper use of foods and dietary recommendations. While 
refugees in a focus group explained that this was beneficial, they also explained that they “did not 
have the resources to actually apply the knowledge… so the knowledge was there but they could 
not do anything with it” (personal communication, April 26, 2019). AFOD also goes to the field 
when the food distribution period is over to disseminate information about proper nutrition and 
observe what is going on in the settlement (personal communication, April 26, 2019).  
There is also a lack of cooking supplies and firewood, which may affect the quality of the 
food being served simply because of how the food is processed. The dry corn that refugees receive 
is more palpable when it is milled, however this is not always possible because it is costly and 
because it requires force, that elderly people especially do not possess (focus group, personal 
communication, April 26, 2019).  
Stability 
Overall, there is a lack of stability since availability, access, and utilization are not ensured.  
Food security in the settlement is, for the most part, completely reliant on donor support and 
dependent on refugees having access to food aid. The GoU has attempted to tackle this by creating 
the self-sufficiency model, however, it has not been as effective as planned. Furthermore, self-
sufficiency cannot be expected when refugees do not have the physical strength to be working to 
cultivate due to the existing lack of food security. It is a self-perpetuating cycle that is hard to 
escape. 
Coping Mechanisms 
This reliance on food aid does not allow refugees to be fully independent however, they 
find their own ways to ensure they are able to eat some food every single day of the month. The 
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following are the most commonly reported coping mechanisms (personal communications, April 
18, 23, 24, 26, 2019): 
1) Eating smaller and fewer meals in a day 
2) Borrowing food from neighbors and stores 
3) Adults eating smaller portions to be able to feed children 
4) Relying on friends in the host-community to invite refugees over for food 
5) Expending less energy (adopting a more sedentary lifestyle) 
6) Gambling 
7) Village-Savings Loans Associations 
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Chapter 7: Food Aid and Socioeconomic Structures 
Rather than denying the reality on the ground and sticking to the theoretical ideals that 
underpin food aid, food aid must be appreciated for its actual role. Doing so allows for existing 
gaps to be identified and leveraged to enhance socioeconomic structures in the settlement that 
could, overtime, eliminate the current state of food insecurity in Adjumani.  
Livelihoods 
Livelihoods, as discussed in the literature review, refer to the means used by refugees to 
maintain and sustain life. A large part of refugee’s livelihoods, if not in their entirety, are dependent 
on food aid. This creates a situation of dependency that does not facilitate a shift into a self-
sufficient way of life, which is the goal of both the UNHCR and the OPM. There is a need for 
income-generating activities to provide an actual avenue to self-sustaining lives.  
Out of the 17 refugees interviewed, only three reported having any kind of income-
generating activity. Two of the refugees worked with implementing partners, and one refugee sold 
handicrafts to the host and refugee communities. Five refugees explained that when they first 
arrived, they had small business in the settlement: selling sugar, sewing, selling clothes… 
However, due to a lack of disposable income, these businesses had to shut down. All refugees 
expressed a very strong desire to work, but they all faced the same challenge: no start-up capital 
(personal communications, April 18, 23, 24, 26, 2019). Some refugees were trained teachers and 
doctors, skills which have incredible value, especially in settlements where medical and 
educational services are hard to obtain. However, their skills, rather than being leveraged, are left 
abandoned. These refugees showed interest in wanting to become employed in their field of study, 
or in any possible job, however they said there were no opportunities available (personal 
communications, April 18, 23, 24, 26, 2019). There is a discrepancy between the 2006 Refugee 
Act, which grants refugees the right to “practice the profession a refugee holds qualifications for” 
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and to “access employment opportunities and engage in gainful employment” (GoU, 2006, Article 
29[1e]iii-vii). and the opportunities they are granted on the ground.  
The livelihood organizations interviewed outlined a number of programs they run to 
engage refugees, but at the same time, these NGOs remained largely invisible in the field. Few 
refugees reported knowing what these NGOs actually do and explained that they don’t openly 
explain what services they offer (personal communications, April 18, 23, 24, 26, 2019). The few 
refugees that were aware of the existence of such organizations became aware of possible programs 
via word of mouth or by seeing these partners on the ground. Even then, the NGOs have a very 
selective screening process that marginalizes a number of refugees. In a focus group of 
predominantly young men, they expressed frustrations in the fact that all livelihood programs were 
geared towards women who had suffered from GBV and little attention was paid to the youth, who 
are the future of the settlement (focus group, personal communication, April 24, 2019). The 
selective screening process and lack of visibility on behalf of the NGOs seems to disseminate a 
dismissive attitude of “it is what it is” and “could be worse” that does not serve well when it comes 
to empowering refugees.  
Socioeconomic Structures 
Improving livelihoods by offering employment opportunities, better education, better 
health services, increased forms of social capital and social networks, and strengthening the formal 
and informal economy would allow for food security to be obtained from a bottom-up approach. 
Right now, food security is out of the control of refugees. This creates feelings of hopelessness 
and powerlessness, that coupled with a stagnant life, lead to feelings of real despair. Some refugees 
referenced other refugees who had travelled back to South Sudan to work because they were in 
such dire need of money. “At least there [we] can do stuff” (personal communication, April 24, 
2019).  They stopped caring about safety, what mattered more was having money to survive 
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(personal communication, April 18, 24, 2019). One refugee was recorded saying the following 
(personal communication, April 18, 2019):  
“The food they are bringing us is letting us down, we are powerless, we are hungry, we 
can’t do anything here. The UNHCR has to increase the money, if they don’t, the least they 
can do for us is bring us vans to go to back to Sudan. With the hunger we are experiencing 
it is better if they shoot us once there and then we die. These underage children are suffering 
with no food, they can’t expect parents to sit and wait around… children must go to 
school.” 
This sentiment was reflected in the interviews of many refugees. They all have a strong 
desire to take their life back into their own hands.  
Food Aid: An Economic Asset 
Given the current situation there are very limited opportunities for enhancing livelihoods. 
Food aid, thus, becomes a means to securing a better life as there are no alternatives in the 
settlement. To do so, refugees sell rations or use cash to buy items that render them with a sense 
of “normalcy”. The problem is that in doing so they are taking away from achieving food security.  
Theoretically and legally food rations are seen as strictly intended for food and as a tool of ensuring 
that refugees are somewhat food secure. In implementing cash-based interventions, the UNHCR 
was trying to shift away from this dependency and trying to create an asset for refugees to 
capitalize on and enhance economic mobility in the settlements. However, with funding 
reductions, the role of cash-assistance has been stripped to its bare minimum: enough money to 
buy food to survive. On the ground, NGOs currently see food aid as a means to food security, and 
in part, as the only means to achieving food security. When different aid workers were asked why 
refugees were not allowed to engage in economic activities, the common answer was that they 
(NGOs) are unable to control the market and then protect refugees from shocks and adverse effects 
(personal communications, April 23, 24, 2019). However, this ignores the fact that refugees were 
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functioning in societies with markets before becoming displaced and the fact that economies are 
an inevitable aspect of every society around the world.   
This study shows that there are other ways to obtain food security and other factors 
necessary for food security. Refusing to acknowledge that refugees are using this food aid to 
engage in economic activities, and then blaming refugees for their suffering because of misuse of 
funds, is to ignore the reality that is occurring in the settlements. If we look at food aid for its actual 
and practical role, we realize that there is a huge missing gap in the settlement: access to an 
economy. It is important to build up socioeconomic structures in the settlement because they 
provide a longer-term and more sustainably viable solution to food security.  
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Chapter 8: Solutions for a More Sustainable Future 
Ultimately, the goal is to create a state of food sovereignty that empowers refugees to 
become self-sufficient and more than capable of achieving food security on their own. Possible 
solutions are outlined below, however, these all require more research and tests of viability. 
Supporting literature is included where applicable, but more time was required to find studies and 
policy proposals to back up all solutions.  
Government of Uganda and Local Government 
Solution Components Justification 
New land 
redistribution 
plan  
• Rather than allocating 30x30 plots of land to 
refugees, open larger spaces of land devoted 
only to farming 
• Farmers’ associations and groups could be 
created to cultivate these lands and ultimately 
sell in local markets, to larger agro-processing 
plants, or to the WFP P4P program in the long 
run 
• Increase the capabilities of farmers by 
providing more modern agricultural techniques 
• Offer spaces for rearing animals for ethnic 
groups that are not farmers 
 
• RDO currently trying to 
secure land for cultivation 
by refugees (personal 
communication, April 26, 
2019) 
• Maaji has secured 20 
acres of land for refugees 
(personal communication, 
April 26, 2019) 
• Baratuku and Elema have 
secured land for 
pastoralist refugees 
(personal communication, 
April 26, 2019) 
• Refugees in Ayilo have 
been given goats which 
reduces children’s 
reliance on food at 
schools (personal 
communication, April 26, 
2019) 
Stronger 
coordination 
of efforts 
• Strengthening the capacity of local 
governments and community institutions 
• Streamline the efforts of organizations to 
ensure there is limited overlap and 
fragmentation of efforts 
• Develop a model that is more financially 
sustainable 
• Uganda Refugee and 
Host Population 
Empowerment (ReHoPE): 
new framework for 
coordinating national and 
local efforts with those of 
different NGOs. Focus on 
agriculture, income-
generating activities, and 
a graduation approach  
• Development Response to 
Displacement Impacts 
Project (DRDIP): 
improve access to basic 
social services, expand 
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economic opportunities, 
enhance environmental 
management. 
Update 
census data 
collection 
methods 
• Use UNHCR biometric data to assist in 
drawing more recent census data with regards 
to refugees 
• Increase the frequency of collection 
• Standardization of 
national IDs will facilitate 
data collection and will 
help keep data updated 
more often 
General 
Interventions 
to Augment 
Food 
Security 
• Food security is a problem that is also being 
tackled by the government  
• Agricultural Development 
Strategy and Investment 
Plan – Ministry 
Agriculture, Animal 
Industries, and Fisheries: 
focusing on agricultural 
production and 
productivity, improving 
access to markets, adding 
value to products, 
creating an enabling 
environment, 
strengthening institutions 
 
United Nations and Donors 
Solution Components Justification 
Reframe the 
mentality 
around 
funding 
• Shift funding from short-term emergency relief 
to investment in projects with long-term 
sustainability 
• Make member countries commit to funding 
targets for given period of times 
 
• This would allow UN 
bodies and implementing 
partners to plan projects 
based on how much 
funding they are going to 
receive, rather than facing 
constant uncertainty 
 
Modernize 
the cash 
distribution 
process  
• Shift towards mobile money, blockchain 
technology… to make the process run more 
smoothly 
• Paynter (2017) looks at 
how the UN is using 
blockchain technology 
with Syrian refugees in 
• Grijalva-Eternod et al. 
(2018) address how 
Somalia is using SIM 
cards for cash-distribution 
50% Food 
50% Cash 
• Consider an approach where refugees are 
provided food rations alongside a monthly 
stipend 
• This will allow refugees to buy food locally 
when possible, but to still have access to food 
if local markets are constrained because of lack 
of rain.  
• It will also allow for long-term thinking in 
investment opportunities to start up small 
businesses 
• Supported by various 
individuals that work in 
different implementing 
agencies in Adjumani 
(personal 
communications, April 
18, 2019) 
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Strengthen 
Local 
Purchases 
• Support farmers with training 
• Extend the availability of credit 
• Supply improved seeds, adapted tools, and 
inputs 
• Improvement of infrastructure 
• Promotion of local production of blended 
foods 
• Strengthening farmers’ organizations 
• Improve storage capacities  
• Bronkhorst (2011) 
explains the different 
interventions that must be 
taken together with local 
purchases to strengthen 
the effects 
 
Non-Governmental Organizations 
Solution Components Justification 
More 
inclusive 
screening of 
beneficiaries 
• Try to broaden the range of refugees that have 
access to service 
• Increase awareness on who is able to receive 
services and explain why 
• Establish different programs that target 
different demographics of refugees  
• Various staff members of 
livelihood NGOs 
discussed how the 
services cannot reach 
everyone (personal 
communications, April 
24, 25, 2019) 
• Refugees expressed a lack 
of awareness about 
existing programs 
(personal 
communications, April 
24, 25, 2019) 
 
Increase 
employment 
opportunities 
• Attempt to employ more refugees when 
possible 
• Link refugees with skills (ie. Medical skills) to 
positions within NGOs (ie. Assistant doctor) 
• Use existing refugee labor to fill gaps in 
service delivery 
• Would provide refugees 
with a sense of worth and 
opportunities to put the 
skills they possess into 
good use 
• There is a need for such 
services, relying on 
existing labor would 
facilitate the process of 
employment 
• Refugees treating 
individuals of the same 
ethnic groups might 
possess knowledge that 
doctors from Uganda (or 
any other country) may 
not 
Enhancing 
availability 
and quality of 
services 
• Ensure that schooling is free and more 
accessible so that refugees don’t need to spend 
money where it is not necessary 
• Place medical clinics closer to refugee centers. 
If there is a shortage of staff employ refugees 
from South Sudan  
• Supported by various 
individuals that work in 
different implementing 
Supported by various 
individuals that work in 
different implementing 
agencies in Adjumani in 
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• Ensure that the information being provided by 
services can be utilized with the resources 
available to refugees 
their study of refugees in 
Adjumani 
More 
transparency 
• Release NGO operations to the District, work 
via the district to allow for better coordination 
• Release resource envelope so that District can 
more accurately assess whether services are 
properly meeting the 70/30 target (70% of 
services to refugees, 30% of services to host 
community) 
• Currently NGOs in 
Adjumani are not 
working via the district, 
they just establish 
themselves and work on 
their own (District 
planner, personal 
communication, April 30, 
2019) 
• NGOs have not yet 
signed on to releasing 
their resource envelopes 
(District planner, personal 
communication, April 30, 
2019) 
Formalization 
of VSLAs 
• Formalize VSLAs and provide assistance in 
starting them up to increase their usage 
• Create programs that promote the use of 
VSLAs 
• Food for the Hungry 
encourages refugees to 
get loans in order to raise 
more income (personal 
communication, April 17, 
2019) 
• Some refugees are 
already doing this on their 
own. Formalizing the 
process and providing 
safe boxes might increase 
number of refugees that 
use VSLAs (personal 
communication, April 24, 
25, 2019) 
More 
networking 
opportunities  
• Increase opportunities for refugees to come 
together and share their experiences and their 
opinions 
• Create events for refugees to interact with 
people outside of their immediate circles 
• Refugees surrounded by 
friends with a positive 
mentality reflected a more 
positive mentality 
themselves 
• Sseguya et al. (2018) 
discuss the relationship of 
social capital with 
achieving food security at 
a household level 
 
Broader Settlement Plans 
Solution Components Justification 
Establish 
youth centers 
• Create spaces where the youth can come 
together and discuss issues facing the 
settlement 
• Young refugees 
expressed a lot of 
frustration with their lack 
of involvement in 
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• Create avenues for them to communicate 
issues to a person who will listen and try to 
make change happen 
 
decision making and say 
in matters relating to the 
settlement (focus group, 
personal communication, 
April 24, 2019) 
• They also expressed a 
desire to be involved with 
the RWC (focus group, 
personal communication, 
April 24, 2019) 
Improve 
public 
transportation 
in settlement  
• Provide free shuttle services for refugees who 
live far from food distribution points 
• Establish a public transport system that can be 
run by refugees as a means of enhancing their 
ability to move around the settlement and 
other settlements in the area 
• Refugees expressed 
annoyance at having to 
spend their limited money 
on transportation (focus 
group, personal 
communication, April 26, 
2019) 
• Refugees also expressed a 
desire to have access to 
more affordable and 
convenient methods of 
transportation (focus 
group, April 24, 2019) 
 
Rely on 
innovative 
sustainability 
initiatives to 
reduce costs 
• Use human and animal feces as biofuel for 
cooking 
 
• Spitzer, Mau, and 
Gross (2018), 
researchers at Ben-
Gurion University 
Zuckerberg Institute for 
Water Research, 
refined a process to 
heat solid human waste 
in a special pressure 
cooker to create a 
reusable biomass that 
resembles coal.  
Skills 
inventory 
• Collect information on the skills that every 
refugee possesses 
• This would allow 
organizations to attempt 
to create opportunities 
based on the capabilities 
of refugees 
• Organizations could run 
experiments to assess if 
self-sustaining areas can 
be created 
 
 
  
HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE IN PROTRACTED EMERGENCIES 78 
Chapter 9: Conclusions 
 While food aid does have its shortfalls, its importance and accomplishments cannot be 
dismissed. Compared to 100 years ago, there is a significant increase in the support refugees are 
receiving around the world, however, more must still be done to support the present crises. What 
is important is to look at the real practical role of food aid to understand what is missing in the 
settlement to sustain long-term, autonomous, food security: income-generating activities within 
some kind of economy. The limitations of food aid are further exemplified by the marginalization 
of the everyday farmer in procurement, the innate hypocrisy in the institutional defense of cash-
based interventions, the lack of dietary diversity of in-kind food aid, and the high-levels of chronic 
food insecurity in Boroli and Mireyi refugee settlements. IGAs are imperative to refugee’s overall 
well-being as they offer an alternative, autonomous, and more sustainable means of achieving food 
security.  
Under Ugandan law and international law, refugees (especially women and children) are 
guaranteed certain rights. Food is a fundamental right that is also protected under a number of 
international, regional, and local frameworks. Funding challenges cannot be an excuse to diminish 
access to fundamental human rights. The numbers of refugees in Uganda from South Sudan is 
continuing to increase, which will continue to add pressure to an already stressed situation. Despite 
no longer being an emergency refugee situation, it demands many of the same needs. More must 
be done.   
Yet, once again, it comes down to funding. As refugee emergencies become protracted 
situations, they begin to lose media attention and thus donor attention. However, refugees from 
South Sudan have, for the most part, been in Adjumani since 2013. The situation in their country 
of origin does not look like it is going to improve in the near future and current interventions cannot 
continue to be justified under the mentality that they are simply meant to provide support to 
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refugees in the short term. It is important to raise awareness on the issues these refugees are facing 
in efforts to attract donors. The reality is that little can be done without money to initiate any kind 
of more sustainable project. The mentality around funding must be changed from one of short-
term emergency relief to one of long-term investment in sustainable development projects that will 
enhance self-reliance.  
Future research needs to scope down on a specific aspect of livelihood activities and their 
relationship with food aid and food security. This research could guide funders to invest in new 
and innovative projects that would ameliorate the lives of refugees in a sustainable manner. There 
also needs to be more research done on procurement policies as well as on the rationalization that 
different stakeholders provide for decreasing funding and for minimizing economic opportunities 
in the settlements for refugees.  
The challenges facing refugees and facing these settlements are comprised of many 
different moving parts, rendering the situation one of the most interactable problems in the world. 
Within the global development agenda, it has a unique positioning as there is a complex interaction 
of local, regional, and international stakeholders attempting to tackle the many issues present. As 
the world moves forward to accomplish the SDGs, the rights of refugees cannot be ignored or 
seconded to the needs of other developing countries simply because they are stateless. Especially 
because no single country can assume responsibility for ensuring that their development needs are 
met, it is the responsibility of all member states in the UN to take action and catalyze change. 
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Appendices 
 
Appendix 1: List of Formal Interviews with Key Informants 
 
Date Subject Location 
April 12, 
2019 Office of the Prime Minister (OPM) Official Kampala 
April 17, 
2019 Implementing Partner A Adjumani 
April 17, 
2019 Implementing Partner B Adjumani 
April 17, 
2019 Implementing Partner C Adjumani 
April 23, 
2019 Implementing Partner D Boroli 
April 24, 
2019 Field Worker A Boroli 
April 26, 
2019 Implementing Partner A Adjumani 
April 30, 
2019 Adjumani District Planner Phone 
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Appendix 2: List of Interviews with Refugees 
 
Subject # Date Arrival Location Gender Age HH Size 
1 April 18, 2019 2013 Mireyi Female 38 6 
2 April 18, 2019 2016 Mireyi Female 26 5 
3 April 18, 2019 2017 Mireyi Male 26 2 
4 April 18, 2019 2014 Mireyi Female 32 7 
5 April 18, 2019 2013 Mireyi Female 29 7 
6 April 18, 2019 2014 Mireyi Female 31 8 
7 April 23, 2019 2015 Boroli Male 25 6 
8 April 23, 2019 2014 Boroli Male 30 1 
9 April 23, 2019 2016 Boroli Female 17 2 
10 April 23, 2019 2014 Boroli Female 17 13 
11 April 23, 2019 2013 Boroli Male 62 6 
12 April 23, 2019 2013 Boroli Male 67 2 
13 April 23, 2019 2013 Boroli Female 27 8 
14 April 24, 2019 2014 Boroli Male 43 8 
15 April 24, 2019 2013 Boroli Male 23 1 
16 April 24, 2019 2015 Boroli Female 37 6 
17 April 24, 2019 2013 Boroli Male 19 1 
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Appendix 3: List of Focus Groups with Refugees 
 
Date Location Number of Participants 
April 24, 2019 Boroli 4 
April 26, 2019 Mungula I 9 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE IN PROTRACTED EMERGENCIES 87 
Appendix 4: Interview Guide Refugees 
 
General 
# Name Age Gender Years Family Size Cash / Food IGA 
        
 
Life in the Settlement 
1- What has changed since you arrived at the settlement?  
2- How would you describe your daily life at the settlement now?  
3- What do you like/dislike about the settlement? 
4- What humanitarian assistance programs are in place in the settlement?  
5- Are you a beneficiary of any programs? Have they helped you?  
6- What do you eat for breakfast, lunch, and supper? 
7- How do you feel physically throughout the day?  
 
Livelihoods 
1- Relationships 
a. Do you have many friends here? Are you able to interact with locals a lot? 
b. Have there been tensions over the years or does everyone get along well? 
2- Businesses 
a. Do you have any kind of job or business? Did you have a business in South Sudan?  
b. Do you gain income in any way? 
3- Malnutrition 
a. How often do people in your family fall sick? 
b. What do you do when they fall sick? 
c. Are there Sudanese doctors that could help in the settlement? 
 
HFIAS 
In the last month…  
1- Did you worry that your household would not have enough food? 
2- Were you or any household member not able to eat the kinds of foods you preferred because 
of a lack of resources?  
3- Did you or any household member have to eat a limited variety of foods due to a lack of 
resources?  
4- Did you or any household member have to eat some foods that you really did not want to eat 
because of a lack of resources to obtain other types of food?  
5- Did you or any household member have to eat a smaller meal than you felt you needed 
because there was not enough food? 
6- Did you or any household member have to eat fewer meals in a day because there was not 
enough food? 
7- Was there ever no food to eat of any kind in your household because of lack of resources to 
get food? 
8- Did you or any household member go to sleep at night hungry because there was not enough 
food? 
9- Did you or any household member go a whole day and night without eating anything because 
there was not enough food?  
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Food Assistance 
1- Why did you decide food assistance? 
2- What food comes in the food basket every month? 
3- How long does the food last? 
4- Do you sell any of the food? 
5- How do you distribute the food?  
 
Cash Assistance 
1- Why did you decide cash assistance? 
2- How do you spend the cash? 
3- Where do you spend the cash? Who do you buy from? 
4- Have food prices on the market increased? 
5- What foods do you buy with the cash? 
6- How long does the cash last? 
 
Rearing Animals  
1- Do you have any chicken or cows…? 
2- How did you get them? 
3- What do you do with them? 
4- How long do they live for?  
5- What are the biggest challenges with rearing here in the region?  
 
Growing Crops 
2- Do you grow any food for yourself?  
3- Which food is that? 
4- Where do the seeds come from? 
5- What are the biggest challenges with growing crops here in this region? 
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Appendix 5: Interview Guide Key Informants 
 
General Questions 
1- What is your mission and your vision?  
2- What settlements do you operate in? 
3- What have been significant key events in Adjumani? 
4- What projects do you currently have ongoing in Adjumani? 
5- What projects of yours have most succeeded? 
6- Where do you think more work needs to be done?  
7- What are the biggest challenges facing your organization?  
8- What are the biggest challenges facing the settlements? 
9- How would you describe the nature of relationships between locals and refugees? 
10- Who are your biggest funders? 
 
Food Security Specific 
1- How do you define food security? 
2- How do you work to ensure food security in the camps? What about in the local community? 
3- What other organizations do you work with? 
4- Do you screen beneficiaries? What criteria do you use? 
5- What are the biggest challenges when it comes to access, availability, utilization, stability, and 
sustainability? 
6- Food rations 
a. What comes in the food basket monthly? 
b. How does this differ from what refugee get? 
c. How are portions determined? 
d. How have they changed? 
e. What non-food items are provided? 
7- Cash assistance 
a. How much do they get now? 
b. What did they get before the cuts? 
c. When did the cuts take place? 
8- Is the point to shift all refugees towards cash assistance? 
9- Did you do anything to fight against the cuts? Is anything being done now? 
10- Land 
a. Is the land allocated enough to sustain proper livelihoods? 
b. How do the settlements differ in terms of the potential for the land usage? 
c. What could be done to improve this land? 
11- Jobs 
a. Are refugees able to get employed? 
b. Why aren’t doctors, teachers hired within the settlement? 
c. What IGA activities do you offer? 
12- How do you see things playing out in the future? 
 
Humanitarian Assistance 
1- Do you think humanitarian assistance has failed or succeeded? 
2- What else could be done to ensure food security? 
3- If it is a fundamental human right how do you justify the current situation? 
4- Do you think integration of refugees and locals in the market would be beneficial? 
a. To what extent are locals and refugees involved in food supply for the settlements? 
b. What are the biggest obstacles? 
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Appendix 6: Participant Informed Consent Form 
 
Title of the Study: Humanitarian Action in Complex Emergencies: A Case Study of Food Security 
 
My name is Victoria Puglia. I am a student with the SIT Global Development Studies Program in 
Uganda.  
 
I would like to invite you to participate in a study I am conducting as part of the SIT Study Abroad 
program I am on. Your participation is voluntary. Please read the information below and ask questions 
about anything you do not understand before deciding whether to participate. If you decide to participate, 
you will be asked to sign this form and you will be given a copy of this form.  
 
Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of this study is to explore the effectiveness of food assistance on long-term food  
security for refugees and their host communities. I will be looking at: 
1- The process of food procurement and distribution 
2- The involvement of refugees and locals in food supply for the settlement 
3- The effects of culture, gender, and age on food security 
4- The nature of relationships between refugees and locals 
 
Study Procedures 
Your participation will consist of an interview and will take approximately 45 minutes of your time. We 
will be in a quiet location where no one will be able to listen to what we discuss. The interviews will be 
recorded. However, if you do not want to be recorded, that is okay, you are still able to take part in the 
study. I may also ask to take photos of your food, farm, house… You are still able to take part in the study 
if you do not want to be photographed.  
 
Potential Risks and Discomforts 
There are no foreseeable risks to participating in this study and no penalties should you choose not to 
participate; participation is voluntary. During the interview, you have the right not to answer any question 
and discontinue participation at any time. Some questions might remind you of your initial experiences at 
the settlement, which might be something you do not want to talk about. Furthermore, some questions 
will look at current challenges of living in the settlement, which might not be the easiest topics to discuss.  
 
Potential Benefits 
The benefits to this study are that it will allow for an assessment of the current food assistance framework 
and hopefully inform future actions to improve the lives of those in the settlement and host communities.  
 
Confidentiality 
Any identifiable information obtained in connection with this study will remain confidential. I will not 
record your name or any identifying characteristics to ensure that your participation remains confidential. 
I will use a code for gender, a code for age, and a code for how long you have been at the camp instead. 
Recordings and raw interview notes will be destroyed once they are properly transcribed. The only person 
that will know what you said will be me and the translator. This data will be stored in a locked document 
on my computer so it cannot be accessed by anyone. When the results of the research are published or 
discussed in conferences, no identifiable information will be used.  
 
Participation and Withdrawal 
Your participation is voluntary. Your refusal to participate will involve no penalty or loss of benefits to 
which you are otherwise entitled. You may withdraw your consent at any time and discontinue 
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participation without penalty. You can ask for your data to be withdrawn from the study. You are not 
waiving any legal claims, rights or remedies because of your participation in this research study.  
 
 
“I have read the above and I understand its contents and I agree to participate in the study. I acknowledge 
that I am 18 years of age or older.” 
 
 
Participant’s signature ______________________________ Date ________________ 
 
 
Researcher’s signature ______________________________ Date ________________ 
 
 
Consent to Audio-Record Interview 
Initial one of the following to indicate your choice: 
_____ I agree to be audio-recorded 
_____ I do not agree to be audio-recorded 
 
Consent to be photographed  
Initial one of the following to indicate your choice: 
_____ I agree to be photographed 
_____ I do not agree to be photographed 
 
Researcher’s Contact Information 
If you have any questions or want to get more information about this study, please contact me at 
puglia.victoria.victoria@gmail.com or 0782508661. If I am not available, please contact my advisor at 
charlotte.mafumbo@sit.edu . 
 
Rights of Research Participant – IRB Contact Information 
In an endeavor to uphold the ethical standards of all SIT proposals, this study has been reviewed and 
approved by a SIT Study Abroad Local Review Board or SIT Institutional Review Board. If you have 
questions, concerns, or complaints about your rights as a research participant or the research in general 
and are unable to contact the researcher please contact the Institutional Review Board at: 
 
School for International Training 
Institutional Review Board 
1 Kipling Road, PO Box 676 
Brattleboro, VT 05302-0676 USA 
irb@sit.edu 
802-258-3132 
 
 
** Note: Informed consent was received orally from refugees and for interviews that were impromptu or 
over the phone.   
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Tables 
 
Table 1 
Household Food Insecurity Access Scale 
 
 
Note: This table shows how the HFIAS score was calculated. The average score for every 
participant and every question was calculated.  
              Question #
Participant #
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 HFIAS Score
1 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 1 20
2 3 3 3 3 3 1 3 1 20
3 3 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 12
4 3 3 3 3 3 2 3 3 23
5 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 24
6 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 24
7 3 2 1 3 3 1 1 2 16
8 3 2 3 3 3 1 3 1 19
9 3 3 2 3 3 1 3 1 19
10 3 1 2 2 1 1 1 2 13
11 3 2 2 3 3 2 2 1 18
12 3 1 2 3 3 1 3 1 17
13 3 3 3 3 3 1 2 0 18
14 3 1 1 3 3 1 2 0 14
15 3 3 2 3 3 3 1 2 20
16 3 3 2 3 3 1 1 0 16
17 3 2 2 3 3 1 3 0 17
Average 3,00 2,35 2,29 2,82 2,76 1,53 2,18 1,29 18,24
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Figures 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Image of macro and micronutrient values for a food basket inclusive of CSB. Note that 
Vitamin A and Vitamin D is higher that pictured because vegetable oil is fortified.   
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Figure 2. Image of macro and micronutrient values for a food basket with no CSB. Note that 
Vitamin A and Vitamin D is higher that pictured because vegetable oil is fortified.   
